00:00 Gilbert Achcar: [inaudible] avoid the trap, or the easy slope, of portraying the situation in Syria in sectarian terms. When there is no doubt or dispute that the regime has used sectarianism historically — it's a regime which bases itself primarily on people belonging to the sect of the Assad family, the Alawites, who are overwhelming in the regime, [inaudible] completely overwhelming, and in the elite army [inaudible], and have become even overwhelming in the [inaudible].
01:04 But at the same time, of course, the Alawites are in Syria ten percent of the population, and if the regime had only ten percent of the population on its side, it would have [fallen a] long time [ago] [?]. So there are first of all other minorities, but there are also a huge number of Sunnis on the side of the regime, for various reasons. So the regime has a base of its own; it's not only an Alawite regime. And there are, of course, Alawites in the opposition, and sometimes they are repressed much more violently, because they are seen as traitors by the regime, with a sectarian mentality.
02:06 Second point: I mean, I don't think we need to embellish other sides when we are dealing with the ugliness of what is happening today in the region. Actually, I mean, a core reason of what is happening is in the Baathist [?] [inaudible] in both Iraq and Syria. Both of them have been completely murderous, and for a while the Syrian regime was actually the lesser evil, because the Iraqi regime was much more brutal and had indeed killed huge numbers of people, either through eliminations and all that — not to mention the chemical weapons, before [inaudible]: the chemical [inaudible] occurred in Halabja, and in the war with Iran. So we have to take all that into consideration.
03:10 And also not — I mean, and I know this, I even wrote articles a few weeks ago in newspapers warning against any illusion about Turkey, when Turkey intervened in northern Syria recently. Turkey has its own designs in Syria. It is intervening in ways which are actually quite similar to those of Iran, relying [?] on Turkmen [inaudible], controlling the areas [inaudible]. And Turkey recently actually made a deal, especially with Russia, and you see how the onslaught on Aleppo went without any meaningful Turkish reaction. Basically Erdoğan has sold — because he felt himself in trouble after the coup and all that — he basically [cut a deal] [?] that he was putting his interest in this part of Syria: fighting the Kurds. That's his obsession, and definitely, for him, Assad is a minor consideration compared to the Kurds. Because the Kurds are the enemy within. They are internal. They are actually — the vast majority of the Kurds of Kurdistan is in Turkey.
04:48 And the same will be in Iraq. Don't have any illusions: Turkey will seize any pretext to intervene in Iraq [?] to establish its own [inaudible] and control. The Turkish state is a state which is not less than Iran an expansionist power in the region, and we are seeing in some way a kind of new partition — this time not British and French, but Turkish and Iranian — in the region.
05:20 Cockburn has been saying that there are no moderates in the Syrian opposition, only jihadists, for a very long time. So he is repeating himself if he's written that about Aleppo. That has been his line for a very long time, with the conclusion we should do business with Bashar al-Assad. He wrote it very clearly; he is in favour of working with Bashar al-Assad [?]. And this attitude is a criminal attitude. It's a completely reactionary attitude, and anyone believing that this has anything to do with any left-wing values is deeply, deeply wrong.
05:51 And I should say that the spectacle of the left in this country — big sections of the left in this country [?] presented — is a very sorry one, to the point actually that it had become a repellent, especially among the Syrians [?], [who] believe that the left hates the Syrian people, the Syrian revolution. That's terrible. We can come back, if you want, to the discussion about Stop the War [?] and all the recent statements and all. It represents such a regression in internationalism from the tradition that existed, if you think of this country at the time of the Spanish Civil War, when the left [?] forces were demanding weapons for the Republicans, and against the [inaudible] — is very, very justified. I was going to say, the German–Italian bombing of Spain — I mean, you had German–Italian bombing of vast areas of Spain on the side of Franco.
07:27 OK, now the — yeah, I mean, about Hillary Clinton. First of all, I didn't understand what you mean by "surprising combination of neocon and the [inaudible] analysis", because they fit together perfectly. Yes, yes. But she's not a neocon. Neocon is something [inaudible]: people who are in favour of regime change [?]. Neocons are harshly against, for instance, the nuclear deal with Iran. No, she is not that different from Barack Obama, except on the issue — they had the disagreement on the issue of Syria. And I should say that, even from the point of view of the US empire — but even from the point of view of "we have to preserve the regime and get some peace compromise there" — they, I mean, she and those who said "well, for that you need to change the balance of forces", they were right [?], and Obama's completely wrong. And the result is Syria is the largest stain on his legacy. It's a disaster, and he bears huge responsibility for that. He is complicit in a crime against humanity in Syria, by refusing to let the Syrian opposition get the defensive means that it needed to prevent the massacre and the destruction.
08:59 Now, what will happen in the future? I mean, first of all, it's not — well, unfortunately, if you want, but majorities are never sure to win, except if you're thinking of a very long run. But in the long run, as someone famously said, we are all dead. And no, the Syrian regime is not — you don't have a fight, as I said, between ten percent, or even forty percent, and sixty percent. You have a fight between a regime which has air force and is backed by Iran and by Russia, against an opposition which is funded and partially armed by the Gulf and Turkey. But the imbalance is obvious. So in this context, to believe that the opposition will overthrow the regime — I don't think this is on the cards in the present condition, unless you have a very sharp turn, or unless Tehran [?] and Moscow change their mind or whatever. This is again not something foreseeable [?].
10:03 So the issue is whether you have a peace or not. If you have a peace compromise, this would be a compromise between a reactionary regime and an opposition which is dominated by reactionary forces. I mean, I'm certainly someone who makes a very sharp distinction between Islam as a religion and Islamic fundamentalism, but it is a fact that the key [?] armed forces in the Syrian opposition are from the [inaudible]. We're not speaking only of al-Nusra, now Fateh al-Sham [?], but even Ahrar [al-Sham] [?], etc. — I can quote a number of names — Jaish al-Islam, etc. These are forces with an Islamic fundamentalist perspective, and I explained why we got into this situation, which is not the natural inclination of the Syrians. And it's known that many people join these groups because they have money, and [inaudible], because these groups have money; but otherwise they would be [inaudible] than I am. They were not religious or whatever.
11:40 And so the point is that of course no compromise will be [inaudible] a victory or whatever. A compromise is, however, first of all something which is urgent, for even humanitarian reasons, if there are too many Syrians dying [?] in Syria. And secondly, it is indispensable for the war to stop in order for a political process to resume. The potential for this political — progressive political process, democratic political process — is still there. We've seen it, even when you had a ceasefire, and the resumption of some mass demonstrations and activities. The experience of local organisation and all that acquired during the uprising in the war [?] is still there. And for that, for this to be able to develop again and build a future for Syria [inaudible], you need the war to stop. So far.
---