00:00 Catherine Samary: Thank you very much. I will be — and you will be — very frustrated by this debate, precisely because it's quite complicated and it would need a much longer time, both to deal with the comparative aspect of capitalist restoration in China, Russia and elsewhere — that is, Eastern Europe is not Russia, and so on — and secondly to have a political appreciation of the evolution of the world globalised
00:32 capitalist system and the place of those powers in it. But I will not focus of course on China; I will focus a bit more on Russia. First I will raise three points. Why are we questioning, of course, what is the nature of those new powers — imperialist or progressive and so on — because of course
01:04 of the necessity of a clear political standpoint on key important issues. So the first statement, which I will not develop but want to begin with, is a global judgement on the 1989 global turn, within the global phase of the neoliberal, anti-social, counter-revolutionary — in a so-called
01:35 neoliberal phase. 1989, both in China and in Russia and Eastern Europe, meant a turning point towards capitalist restoration, as it was said, and it had an internationally disastrous social and political effect for the working class. I don't want to develop this, but this is a key point to be stressed
02:09 at the beginning, against any idea that even the development of a multipolar kind of world means any progressive aspect on the side of China and Russia. That's the first standpoint. I am in the European Union, especially around the
02:39 question of the continental transformation after 89. I think the German unification, and the destruction and collapse of the Soviet Union, and the other capitalist transformations in the whole continent, in Eastern Europe, played a key role in the disastrous anti-social and anti-democratic radicalisation of the neoliberal European project. So this is the first
03:13 point to stress. Linked with that, I would say also that the idea that the so-called BRICS as new powers represent any kind of consistent and progressive alternative to capitalist domination and imperialist domination is, in my point of view, completely wrong — besides the fact that there should not be any idea of a homogeneous
03:45 grouping. Of course there is a specificity even in the capacity to have some conflicting relationship with the dominant imperialist powers like the US; there is a strong difference between Russia and China on the one hand and the other ones, on military expenses and possibility of confrontation, even if it's not an anti-capitalist
04:17 confrontation and a progressive one. So, that's it for the BRICS. Second point, very rapidly: to stress some differences between Russia and China as far as the scenario of capitalist restoration is concerned. I will not develop it. I am supporting much what he has written on China [?]. I would like very much that we organise at an international level a
04:49 systematic comparative analysis. But altogether I agree with what he says himself for China. There is a general point: I would not argue that capitalist restoration is only something which comes from external pressure. There is an internal element of turning point, with the political and social choices of actors, concrete actors. And one of the
05:22 big differences between Russia and China is that in the first phase of capitalist restoration in Russia you had what we could call a kind of comprador bourgeoisie dominating Russia — that is, Yeltsin. Yeltsin was organically linked with external pressures and powers and influence and financiers and so on, to
05:52 accomplish two main goals, which were the goals that US imperialists did want to fulfil in Russia: that is, destruction of the Soviet Union and capitalist restoration. And yes, indeed, both. I cannot develop it; you can read the article called "From the short Soviet century to Putin's Russia", which is online, which
06:26 I wrote, which develops different phases and so on. That is to say that we must make a big difference between the Yeltsin years and Putin, and between Russia as a whole and China. During the Yeltsin years the industry of Russia was completely destroyed — much more than fifty
06:57 per cent decrease in GDP and so on — up to the turning point, which was 98, when there was the financial crisis and the non-payment crisis, still the end of the Yeltsin era. But it was the beginning of a protectionist kind of orientation, and then Putin came into power. During that period it was a destruction, with domination of oligarchs over the state, privatisation of
07:30 the state by oligarchs, with regional conflicts and so on, and destruction of both the internal and the international strength of the state. Even the capacity to raise taxes was destroyed in that period. There was no real market unification. In that sense the dominant relationships were barter, up to
08:01 98 — but with a real beginning of capitalist accumulation through external relationships, currency from international trade in oil, in raw materials, and with a flow of capital out of Russia, not invested in Russia. So a destruction of that society and of the working class of course,
08:32 but also of the whole industry and strength of the state. So Putin's period came closer to, and tried to have more lessons drawn from, China's experience: that is, to build what [Au Loong Yu?] calls bureaucratic capitalism. I like that very much, so I don't develop here. But Putin
09:02 tried to restructure first the capacity to control taxes and dues on oligarchs, and to try and restructure its influence in and around Russia. So there was then the beginning of a new kind of what Gilbert Achcar has called — which can be discussed — a new kind of phase of Cold War in international
09:36 relationships between Russia and the US. I don't believe this Cold War concept is completely adequate at all, but there are elements of truth there. First of all there was absolutely the extension of NATO up to, and an integration of, Eastern European countries within both NATO and the European Union. And there were increasingly conflicting views about the
10:07 control of oil in the former republics and the Asian part of the territory. But there was also some collaboration — I mean, the support for the anti-terrorist war after 11 September 2001. Even Putin was in agreement with
10:41 the US powers to share this so-called anti-terrorist war, and it is up to now on Chechnya, and also offering today to Obama its services to deal with the Syrian conflict and so on. So I said there are elements of Cold War, but in a completely new world where there are also common interests, like the one I said
11:14 between those big powers — but also conflicts, and a conflicting period around 2003, 4, 5, around what was called the coloured revolutions, including Ukraine. That is, Brzezinski's speech about the need to turn Ukraine towards the Western camp. And
11:45 in general there is no disagreement on the fact that there had been huge amounts of money spent by US administrations and so on to try and reinforce, in all these countries which are between Russia and the European Union — which were confronted with two conflicting projects. One
12:18 from Putin's Russia, to build the Eurasian Union, which is an ongoing project; and the other which came, under the pressure of Poland in particular, from within the European Union: to integrate the very same six countries between Russia and the European Union, not within the European Union but within
12:50 so-called free trade agreements, as a new kind of partnership — I don't know if it exists in English. So you had a period of increasing conflict of that kind. But I will come back on the limitation of that interpretation of a Cold War, to deal with the third point. In that short
13:21 period of intervention I wanted to raise it against campism around the Ukrainian affair. I think Marko will of course develop more the analysis of that point, but I wanted to come back on that. The turning point, Georgia in 2008, was the first point, and Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea was the second point, where it's true that
13:51 Putin came back in the sphere of international relationships with the behaviour of a great power — which produced within the US certainly also an increasing speech of cold war; certain commentators speak of cold war and so on. And there are probably divisions among the US administration how to deal with Russia. But I want to argue against all
14:25 the new phases within the radical left, especially in Europe, of the kind of opposition, polarisation and campist views which occurred already when there was the Kosovo issue and the NATO issue. At that time I already, and within the International, we had a position which opposed campism. What does it mean, campism? Campism
14:57 is to choose a main enemy and then to back it, and refuse criticism within that camp, because it would help precisely the enemy — with the logic "the enemy of my enemy is my friend". This was already a political debate within the far left at the time of Kosovo. And of course Milošević
15:29 was not Putin, and the discussion "was he imperialist" would be stupid. So the position I had defended, and I still defend, is not the idea that they are equivalent imperialist or great power forces. That's not the issue. First of all, what I defended and I still defend is a three-fold kind of position: neither-nor. At that time, neither Milošević nor NATO, but
16:01 for self-determination of Albanians and of peoples of the regions. And today that would be the same: neither the Western policies, be it through NATO or through the European Union, or with the direct support of course of the Kiev government in that policy; nor Putin's; but for self-determination. And of
16:31 course when I said that, this "neither-nor", it is not an abstract analysis, it's an algebraic [formulation] — you see what I mean. What is dominant depends on what is the issue you want to stress. If you want to make the analysis of what is the dominant empire at the world level, there is no hesitation, and there were brilliant reports before, so no problem.
17:04 And that is why also we had to fight against the continuation and redevelopment of NATO, and the so-called war against terrorism in the world, with a free possibility of intervention of US power with its own [?] and so on. That is absolutely needed. Secondly, but
17:39 if you take into account the socialist project, the anti-capitalist project — and Milošević was claiming even more than Putin: Putin doesn't claim to be socialist, but Milošević claimed to be socialist — I mean, it was a disaster, for immediate and very short-term resistance and the rebuilding of an alternative in the background, to stand for a position completely
18:10 independent and critical of great Serbian policies. You don't need to call it imperialist; it's great Serbian, like it was great Russian, and it's better to use this formulation to criticise a policy of domination than to use the term imperialist here without any criteria. I mean, we can discuss it, but we don't need to [prove] Putin being imperialist — even if Putin
18:41 can be eventually — in order to be against any kind of policy which would impose, through military and also through gas wars and all kind of blackmail — no, sometimes yes, economic blackmail and so on — on the
19:11 people of the former Soviet republics, that they belong to Russia. This is not acceptable. One minute. So then, within Ukraine there can be different choices. I don't believe that Putin's Russia is so attractive, even in the Russian-speaking sphere of Ukraine. And so I
19:44 do believe we have to oppose clearly, from the point of view of building alternatives to the existing order, which is a globalised order, to fight against campism on all sides. And I want to argue one point which is of course important for anti-imperialist people. Some of our comrades or close currents from the left would say we have to fight first against our own imperialism. This is a good
20:17 argument, but not enough. Why? With this kind of argument it would be fine to say that when you are in Russia the main emphasis could be against Russia, and when we are here in the European Union the main emphasis could be against NATO and so on. I think this is acceptable but not enough and not efficient. Why? Precisely because, concretely — and I had that argument with
20:48 some comrades of Die Linke in Germany, when they say we have to develop arguments against the dominant press — so in order to make the argument against their own bourgeoisie, they had to qualify Maidan as fascist, without a concrete analysis of the social movement, or wholly subordinated to the US. But anyway, I say, even if we take into account your point of view — I said to the Die Linke comrades — that is,
21:22 focusing against NATO: what has been the main argument to consolidate NATO? It has been Putin's intervention. Now NATO is more popular in Ukraine, in the Baltic republics, in Poland and so on, than it was before, and stronger, consolidated in a way. And Putin on the other side — if you want to defeat Putin's policy and great powers' policy, with its alliance with
21:53 very rightist currents both in the European Union and within the former Soviet Union, with a very rightist, reactionary ideology and so on, on the great Russian new world and so on — if you want to defeat this you have to fight against NATO, and to denounce NATO's expansion, and all which is true in the so-called
22:25 Cold War, but partly through [?] and Brzezinski kind of speeches. So it is not efficient, not enough, to be against your own bourgeoisie. You have to combine on all fronts, and you have to try and build — even if it is very difficult — an alternative. This alternative is anti-capitalist on all sides. And there,
22:56 that's why the Cold War concept is not satisfactory either. In fact if you look at the political scene behind the Ukrainian affair, you see that there are strong interests between Russia and the European Union. The main direct investment in Russia is from the European Union; the main trade is with the European Union. And so now Russia is turning towards China, to strengthen a
23:29 possible relationship of forces in a global negotiation. They did together build some specific Asian banks, which tried to resist the dominance of the IMF and the dependency upon the dollar. But there are strong, close interests between Germany and Russia on energy. They have negotiated directly
23:59 with Russia the pipeline to deliver — oh, same for Italy. And France was very much interested in very close negotiation on the modernisation of the Russian armament industry. And in the London financial sphere, I mean, the Russian oligarchs are very well known. So we are no more in a situation where —
---