00:00 Catherine Samary: Okay, I wanted to begin with the end of Marko's intervention, the first one, because at the end you said that — a very interesting judgement which I can share — that the Ukrainian issue could be understood as a point of dislocation. You said that in the sense where Germany precisely will have to choose between certain aspects
00:34 of its relationship with the US and also with Russia. And in the very recent weeks Germany has decided — like, by the way, I think it was also decided by London — to involve some money in a new bank, the Asian infrastructure investment bank [?], which is a common project between Russia
01:04 and China. Why do I raise this? Because when you come back on Russian military power to intervene, like you say — it's something to do with, when you were saying that, speaking of NATO or US military hegemony, it is one thing, but what are they able to do concretely? I will raise the same question with Russia. Is it in the interest of
01:36 Putin's Russia to launch a military offensive in Ukraine? Or is it, like I read in your own article and intervention, in the interest of Putin to have some control on Ukraine through decentralisation, decentralised power and so on — but not to integrate the
02:07 eastern region within Russia, or launch a war which would raise problems with Germany, France, the European Union, to support such a policy? And even in the relationship between Putin and Greece, when Tsipras went to Russia asking for support — I know that Russia had economic difficulties to answer, but I don't think that is the main reason why Putin said
02:38 no to Tsipras. I think Russia is more interested in the European Union than in Greece or in Ukraine as such. He's using things, but especially the German and Chinese issues are much more important for it. So that's one point I wanted to raise. Second point: the definition of imperialism, which I precisely avoided
03:08 in a way, because it's longer, and then we are in a completely new world. That's the point — then the Leninist definition [?] and so on. And I agree with your formulation about China, for instance, as a great power and an orientation. I would say a similar thing for Russia. I mean, both of them, Russia and China, play in
03:38 the sphere of great power policy in global capitalism. They want to be on the side of imperialism, to be in the better position, to win on energy relationships, on financial relationships. But for instance Russia is not against the European Union — he would have liked to be within the European Union. That's the point. He's not criticising the kind of social relationship and non-democratic Union; he wants to build the very same one. And so
04:14 there are interdependences between those powers, and they want to gain and to be respected as great powers — which is not, of course, our point of view. A third point, a last point, about campism [?]. I would also think that the situation is really serious, yes, when we look at the kind
04:48 of fronts which are proposed with the far right, and where the global view of Russia and Russian policies, Putin's policy, is an alternative to the so-called US, the European Union. I think this is really — and that comes even from within intellectual currents which were supposed to be close
05:18 to [inaudible] — the alliance with the far right is an ongoing process, which is really a big danger. So to finish with a positive point for you: what was said about the importance of the democratic issue in Ukraine, I do believe it's very important. Not only democratic, but linked to democracy as a condition of democracy, the social issue. And there, in
05:52 the resolution we voted at the international meeting of the Fourth International, we had difficulty to propose anything. We worked it with some Ukrainian and Russian comrades, both, and we put forward the idea that was expressed by the very small minority resisting the conscription [?] and resisting war propaganda — both from Russia and from Kiev. War propaganda which is used in both cases to
06:22 prevent social protest and to prevent democratic procedure. We were supporting what they say, that they needed a ceasefire, and that they knew that they needed a ceasefire to push forward any kind of democratic and social procedure, to control — if there is no ceasefire it's impossible to push forward the forces in defence of self-determination in all the regions of Ukraine, in the way to consolidate it. But
06:56 the situation is serious, because even though I do believe that neither the US nor Putin control what is going on on the ground in Ukraine — that was a question I would have liked to discuss with you, Marko. I think that the state no longer has the monopoly to control even the military dimensions of confrontation in Ukraine, and that the far right currents, even
07:28 against any kind of constitutional agreements, are for the moment fighting for confrontation and not accepting any kind of solution, any democratic solution. Even more so, I believe that we do need to make an alliance between those who resist in Russia and the European Union and in Ukraine, for another kind of
08:00 relationship in Europe.
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