00:08 Gilbert Achcar: Right. I take as a starting point, since this is about Syria in the context of the Arab uprising, that there is something that we can call the Arab uprising in the singular, and that is something that I would describe as a long-term revolutionary process that started in 2011 — December 2010 — and will
00:40 carry on, will go on, for many, many years and actually decades to come. So, looking at the situation through that angle, and as in any revolutionary process of this kind you have usually a line of cleavage, a line of demarcation, that emerges dividing, you know, the scene between revolution and
01:12 counterrevolution, to put it in, let's say, simple terms. But true. And the issue is: how do you define this cleavage? How do you define the separation, or what is the criterion — the essential criterion — according to which you make your assessment of the various forces? I mean, historically speaking it would
01:45 be rather easy. I mean, when you take a process like the French Revolution it's rather easy: you know where is the revolutionary camp, you know the counterrevolutionary camp, locally and regionally, at the European level at the very least. Now, the more we progress in history, the more the picture gets complicated with the variety of factors. In the age of imperialism
02:17 it is already more complicated — although, I mean, again, we can think of the Russian Revolution. Well, there were some people that [at the] very, very beginning [would] tell you that this is a German plot, you know, conspiracy theory. And this should ring a bell to some of the assessments that we hear nowadays about some of the revolutions in the region. But that's precisely because those who make such
02:49 assessments don't use as a criterion what a revolution consists of, that is, what it is about. What is the mass movement? What are the revolutionary tasks in the region that is concerned with all that? They replace that with a very simplistic criterion, you know: whatever the US
03:21 says or supports, we should support the reverse. Well, this is extremely simplistic. Of course, if politics were only about, you know, just taking the opposite position of the United States — as Leon Trotsky said about the bourgeoisie, any fool would be a master in strategy and tactics. [It] doesn't take much thinking, reflection, to know how to position yourself: you
03:53 just put a negative sign on every US position. So of course things are much more complex than that, and that's what we have to look at. I mean, if our key consideration is the revolutionary process itself — what it means, what kind of old order, old *ancien régime*, was prevailing in the region, and
04:26 how this *ancien régime* is confronted by this revolutionary shock wave, which again, let me repeat, is only at its beginnings. So how do the various forces fit into this picture? Well, I don't think I need, after everything you've heard since this morning here, to explain why the Syrian regime is not part of the revolution
04:57 but part of the counterrevolution — very much so. Why is it a counterrevolutionary regime facing a revolutionary uprising? I'm sure that you had enough discussion about these aspects. So now let us look at the regional counterrevolution. How does it function? And I think part of the complexity of the whole picture has been
05:28 conveyed by Ewa's [?] report, or Ewa's presentation. I mean, I hope you were able to follow all that, but if you weren't, and you got lost at some point, don't blame yourself. It is quite confusing at some time when you look at the behaviour, the positioning, of various political forces involved in all
05:59 that. When we look at the regional major stronghold of the counterrevolution, which is the Gulf Cooperation Council, we can see that even within this bastion of counterrevolution you have a cleavage, you have rivalries, you have people supporting at some points, you know, different forces. And here I'm referring obviously
06:30 to this cleavage that exists between the Emirate of Qatar on the one hand and the Saudi kingdom, backed by the United Arab Emirates, on the other hand. You have already, you know, another degree in complexity. But basically what they are — basically they differ in the sense that wherever it was possible to support the existing regime, the Saudis have
07:02 been heavily on the side of the existing regime, and it's only in situations where they were not in a position, or not able, to support the existing regime, at least openly, that they have taken different positions. I'll get back to that. The Qataris, because of — I mean, a long story, [I] don't have time to get in[to] details, but anyone interested can find the story in my book here —
07:35 the Qataris are trying, or have been trying, to co-opt the revolutionary process from the start, through their alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. And since the Muslim Brotherhood has been, from the very beginning of this whole process, a major actor, a major regional actor, the Qataris thought that their time has come, [that] they could, through the Muslim Brotherhood, emerge as, you know,
08:05 a regional power, if you want. And that's very much what has been informing their whole political behaviour in the region. And in that regard Turkey was their ally in this business, given the fact that also Turkey had developed close links with the Muslim Brotherhood. And we could see that very, very obviously functioning in various cases —
08:35 especially those cases where the co-optation was most obvious. But this applies of course to Libya, but also to Egypt, to, you know, I mean, the first phase of the revolutionary process there, and other places. And this co-optation [?] was also in the fact that they both were the godfathers — I mean Qatar and Turkey — of the Syrian National Council, not the coalition council, in which the Muslim Brotherhood plays — I
09:09 mean, a main — [plays] the heavyweight, if you want; it plays a main role, in the sense that it's the real heavyweight of the Syrian National Council, which was the previous major spokes[man], group or whatever, for the Syrian uprising. Now, the Saudis are not in this, and actually they resent very much this Qatari game play. I mean, the way
09:40 the Qataris play with fire, for the Saudis, in the sense that they contributed to the destabilisation of the regional order. And in various respects Qatar did indeed contribute to this destabilisation. Just think of the role of Al Jazeera, which is of course [a] Qatari tool, and any analysis of the Arab uprising can't fail but
10:11 underline or emphasise the role, preceding this whole situation, played by something like Al Jazeera. Again, I don't have time to get in[to] details, but I hope we'll be able to do that in the discussion, for anyone interested about that. So, for the Saudis it was, I mean, obviously the main choice is: support the *ancien régime* [?] everywhere. And again, as I said, when it wasn't
10:41 possible at all to do that for various reasons, they would try themselves also to co-opt the revolutionary process. And that's relatively easier in this revolutionary process at this stage because of the lack of strong progressive forces playing a major or central role. This allows, or this gives, much more room for
11:12 possibilities of co-optation by counterrevolutionary forces trying to divert the revolutionary process from any path that would represent a danger for them. Now, in the case of Syria, the Saudis could not possibly come out openly in favour of the Assad regime, and that's because of, I would say, their own ideology.
11:44 The main ideology of the Saudi monarchy, the Saudi kingdom, is Wahhabism, which [is] an extreme form of Islamic fundamentalism. I mean, even within Islamic fundamentalism it's a quite extreme form; it's an ultra-fundamentalist perspective, if you wish, and very sectarian at that. Very sectarian, with a discourse even about the Shia — and mind you, the Alawites are more heretics, between quote marks, from this perspective than even the Shia. But
12:15 even about the Shia the discourse of the Wahhabis is extremely sectarian, extremely violent, extremely hostile, full of hatred. And therefore, knowing the character of the sectarian character of the Syrian regime — in the sense of the use by the Syrian regime of the sectarian factor in Syria — the
12:46 Saudis could not position themselves in support of the regime. And so the alternative to that is precisely to sectarianise the conflict, to try to co-opt it in the name of the fact that the Saudi kingdom sees itself as the — how to say — the main Sunni state, and therefore
13:18 kind of guardian of Sunnism, and in that regard therefore support the uprising from this kind of perspective. Now, this said, the Saudis and the Qataris are in the business of rivalry in Syria. The formation of the Syrian National Coalition came as part of the setback of the Qataris after the first wave of the revolutionary process, when the Qataris appeared,
13:49 as you know, very much triumphant and in [a] very strong position along with their friends the Muslim Brotherhood. When the tide was reversed and the problem started with the Muslim Brotherhood, they also started for Qatar, and here the Saudis went on the offensive and [began] gaining an influential position in the present Syrian national coalition. But all this has to be understood
14:20 as for what they are: that [these] are attempts to co-opt a revolutionary process, and that doesn't make the revolutionary process a counterrevolution. [That] by itself is not to say that there are not, within the revolutionary process, within the forces, [some] that are of a counterrevolutionary nature — and this I guess has been already discussed here, so I won't dwell on that. But I mean this doesn't change
14:51 the central picture of the origin of the uprising, of the meaning of the uprising, of the programme of those who are speaking in the name of the uprising, when we compare it to the *de facto* [?] programme of the regime. So this is where we have to make a judgment. Now, coming to the international scene. Well, the United States is, as
15:23 I said, for some people — including some people, many people actually, on the left — the key obsession. You know, anti-imperialism replaces whatever other value you can have: democracy, socialism, working class, whatever. All these values are superseded by anti-imperialism — and anti-imperialism understood as if only the United States were an
15:55 imperialist country. Now, this whole [thing] also gets to the picture where, I mean, in the extreme you have people believing that basically the United States is pulling the strings of most of what is happening in the region, to the point that you had views that the Egyptian revolution — and I'm speaking of the 2011 one — was actually manipulated by the United States, [that] it's a US conspiracy. And so if some people were
16:28 ready to believe that for Egypt, of course the same and much more [they] believe such views about Syria. And basically this is also predicated on the idea that the United States is almighty. It's not understanding the fact that [the] United States is at the lowest point ever of its influence in the region since the peak of the
17:01 very early '90s, that is, since something like a quarter [of a] century. [The] United States are at a very low point of their regional influence and beyond. Just ask Hamid Karzai if you have any doubt about [it]. The very behaviour of Karzai, if you are following the news, is so ridiculous, and it's such an insult to the US imperium [?] to find this stooge of the United States
17:32 defying Washington in the way that he is doing. And so the United States, faced with the uprising, had resorted to the view that when you can't stop it or block it, try to co-opt it. And how to co-opt it? Well, they had the offer, the Qatar offer and the Qatar mediation, and they tried their best to do it with the Muslim Brotherhood. Basically the US is not
18:03 at all — and this is a major mistake that some people do, because they are not following closely what is happening in the United States — the positioning of the United States is not at all in the business of regime change, which was the kind of slogan of the Bush administration. This has led to the most important disaster in US imperial history. Iraq has been the most important disaster, in many respects, in US imperial history, if you judge it by what is at
18:36 stake, which is much more important even than what was at stake in Vietnam, which is another disaster for the US empire. And the lesson drawn from that is that we should definitely not repeat what we did in Iraq, where we dismantled the local, existing state, and we should maintain the state, keep the state, keep the continuity of the state institutions, and do the changes that are
19:08 necessary in order to appease the popular resentment. And this was captured in the phrase that was very much used from the very beginning of the uprising, about Egypt especially: the orderly transition. And this is what is informing the action of the United States in every single one of the situations in the region, and Syria is no exception.
19:39 Libya was no exception. There's been a very long interview recently by [inaudible], who's one of the major figures in the Libyan coalition, who explains about the whole wheeling and dealing of the western powers — especially, well, London and Paris; London play[ed] a major role here — with Saif al-Islam, trying, you know, to get to some
20:12 kind of agreement with the regime, preserving the regime. And he says very clearly: had the insurrection of Tripoli not overthrown the regime, they would have imposed on us this kind of agreement. And [in] Syria they have been trying to get to some kind of compromise with the regime, not at all to overthrow the regime. Hence the support for
20:43 their faithful servants Kofi Annan and then [Lakhdar] Brahimi and all these mediations. Hence all this cosying up of Washington towards Moscow, trying to convince Moscow, you know, to cooperate and exert some pressure on the Syrian regime. And hence recently — and this fits in this whole picture — this kind of new kind of relation between
21:15 Iran post-Rouhani, the new president, and the shift in the Iranian political line that it represents, and attempts of the United States to get, through that, to some kind of compromise. And this is what, as they did in Libya, imposing on the coalition there a blueprint that provided for the continuity of the state — and of course that was shattered completely by the insurrection in Tripoli and the total collapse of the Libyan
21:46 state. It's like, now it's a country without a state basically, Libya. In Syria you have the same; you can see it in the most recent programme of — or the basis of — the negotiating team in Geneva, which include[s] a commitment to keep the state, to keep the institutions, to keep all that, and to get to some kind of coalition transitional government. Now, what will be
22:21 the fate of this, and will it be the same fate as what happened in Libya? This remains to be seen, but just to mention that. And a final point on — I mean, on this kind of anti-imperialism that regards the United States as, you know, the main criteri[on]. This is predicated on [a] completely
22:52 obsolete view of the world, Cold War conceptions. This is a remnant of the old campism. There's the idea that Russia, you know, is still some kind of progressive state. And this is — I mean, this is absurd, to the point that when you look at what the Putin government represents, the Obama administration appears very progressive.
23:24 I mean, this is a country where you have a flat tax, flat income tax of 10% or something like that. It's a paradise for, you know, capitalism in that sense. And this is of course a very authoritarian regime, manipulating the media, repressing the media, etc. — I don't need to get into that. And of course this is a country of monopoly capital nowadays, including in oil and gas. And if there were any possibilities in
23:56 the past of discussions about the nature of the beast, there absolutely is no possible, you know, discussion nowadays. And I don't think that anyone around is claiming that this is a workers' state, you know, or whatever you want to call it. This would be completely ridiculous. And therefore, I mean, not saying that the Syrian regime is much more heavily backed by Russia, by the counterrevolutionary, reactionary government of Russia, than whatever fake support that
24:29 the United States is giving to the Syrian opposition, is really to be completely blind. And where the picture gets back to, I would say, some normality and clarity is in the present support of Putin to Sisi, open support of Putin to Sisi, and the support of Sisi — or let's say the
25:00 sympathies shown by Sisi, I mean the Egyptian general, to the Syrian regime. And you get here the picture. And Sisi is not himself, of course, in the business of co-opting or anything like that; they see some common basis for convergence with the Syrian regime, in the sense that they are now speaking the same
25:31 language. And this language is the language that we are all very much accustomed to, at the very least since 9/11, 2001: the war on terror. This is the language that the Syrian regime is playing, in order to try to win the sympathy of western countries. This is of course [the] language that Russia, Putin's Russia, has been using from the beginning. And this is the language that
26:02 the military in Egypt are using today in order to restore fully the repressive state that existed under Mubarak. So I think now all these issues should, I hope, clarify the picture. Thank you very much.
## Corrections
- "as **Leonroski** said it about the bourgeoisi[e]" → "as **Leon Trotsky** said about the bourgeoisie". - "old order **older Anan regime**" and "this **anan regime**" → "old **ancien régime**" / "this *ancien régime*"; the captions also give "the **MSAN** regime", read here as *ancien régime* and marked. - "the **Austrian** regime" and "these regime" → "the **existing** regime" — the Saudis' default of backing whatever regime exists, which is the hinge of the argument. - "**the cutteries**", "**the cuties**", "**the cutters**", "**cuttery** game play", "**the Qataries**" → "the **Qataris**" / "Qatari" throughout; "which is of course **cut** tool" → "a **Qatari** tool". - "the role of **Al Jazzer**" → "**Al Jazeera**". - "where the **quotation** was most obvious", "possibilities of **cultation**", "try to **cope** it", "attempts to **go up** a revolutionary process", "try themselves also to **go the** revolutionary process" → "**co-optation**" / "**co-opt**" in each case. Co-optation is the concept the whole talk turns on and the captions never once render it. - "the first phase of the **reversary** process" and "the first wave of the **Rushi** process" → "the **revolutionary** process". - "when the **style** was reversed" → "when the **tide** was reversed". - "just ask **Hamid Karzai** ... the very behavior of **Kai**" → "**Karzai**"; "this **stoouch** of the United States" → "this **stooge**". - "with **safe Islam**" → "with **Saif al-Islam**", Gaddafi's son. - "their faithful servants **Kofan** and then **Iraimi**" → "**Kofi Annan** and then **[Lakhdar] Brahimi**", the two UN envoys to Syria. - "all this **causing up** of Washington towards Moscow" → "all this **cosying up**". - "Iran post **Roani**" → "post-**Rouhani**". - "a completely **obsolate** view" → "**obsolete**". - "a remnant of the old **chemism**" → "a remnant of the old **campism**". - "anyone around is claiming that this is a **war state**" → "a **workers' state**". The captions delete the term the sentence exists to reject, and with it the reference to the old argument "about the nature of the beast" in the preceding line. - "**Cece**" and "**CC**" → "**Sisi**", the Egyptian general, named as such in the captions' own gloss. - "the **rescinian** regime" → "the **Syrian** regime"; "under **Mubara**" → "under **Mubarak**"; "since **911 2001**" → "since **9/11, 2001**". - "started in **2011 December. 2010**" → he corrects himself to December 2010, the start of the Tunisian uprising; rendered as spoken. - Marked and uncertain: "conveyed by **Ewa's [?]** report" — a previous speaker, read from the conference's own speaker list, where Ewa Jasiewicz is the only close fit; "the **de facto [?]** programme of the regime"; "an insult to the US **imperium [?]**"; and "a very long interview recently by **[inaudible]**", one of the major figures in the Libyan coalition — Mahmoud Jibril is the likely candidate but the captions will not support it.