00:00 Gilbert Achcar: Thank you for [the] questions, interventions and all that. I'll just address either questions or issues on which there might be nuances, and won't of course comment on those statements with which I'm in agreement.
00:00 Well, first of all, the picture is more complicated than having one [force] [?] on the side of the opposition which is ISIS, as it is called. Actually ISIS is not al-Qaeda's — [it] doesn't have the al-Qaeda franchise, which has been engaged even in some skirmishes or fighting with ISIS.
00:30 Now, how would you characterise something like the Nusra Front? It's a front which is connected to al-Qaeda and therefore to an extremely reactionary ideology, and it can't be regarded in any way as a progressive force. Now, that doesn't mean that in a clash between them and the regime one should support the regime, as some people deduce from that. Basically they are inserting themselves in a struggle that is, as a whole, a very progressive and just struggle, which is the one that started in 2011 — and I'll get back to that in a moment.
01:32 Then you have also the Islamic Front, which is a collection of organisations of Salafi tendency or Muslim Brotherhood kind of tendency; and you have a split from that [which] is called the Revolutionary Front. And here you can see different connections, different fundings: the Qataris funding the Islamic Front, the Saudis funding the split from them.
02:04 Now, the difference between Qatar and the Saudis here is that Qatar, as I said, from the start tried to co-opt [?] the uprising itself — in terms of bringing to power its allies, the Muslim Brotherhood; whereas the Saudis are actually very much in the same position as the United States, in the sense that they want a stabilisation, they fear very much destabilisation of the region.
02:35 And now their intervention in the Syrian conflict is actually in convergence with that of Washington, in the sense of pushing for some kind of agreement that would keep the main structure of the regime but change figures, and reduce the — I mean, put Sunnis instead of Alawis, to put it in very clear terms.
03:05 Now, the left in Syria is not repeating the same mistake made by the Iranian left, [in] that the Iranian left had illusions, spread illusions, about the nature of the Khomeini leadership. The Syrian left, progressives, whatever you want to call them — the major groups involved in these coalitions, councils and the rest — they don't regard these, like the Islamic Front and all that, as progressive forces, and they are not having the same kind of illusions.
04:06 But the point is that they have not been confronting [inaudible]. The initial problem of the Syrian revolution is the same that we find all over the world: the lack of strategy of progressive forces in imposing themselves as a third camp, at equal distance from the Assad regime and the counter-revolutionary forces of Islamic fundamentalism and the rest. And we can see this in Egypt, we can even see that [in] Tunisia [?], we can see this problem everywhere — and obviously that's also the case, and very much so, in Syria.
04:38 So: the local coordination committees were the real organising force of the uprising in the early stage. Well, they accepted the formation of the National Council, where the Muslim Brotherhood were a main force, backed by Turkey and Qatar, and [which was] abroad, in exile. And that was the initial error already.
05:08 Whereas what was required was to build an independent, progressive, democratic force leading [and] coordinating the Syrian revolution, and equally hostile to the whole regional order, whether represented by the Syrian regime or by the reactionary monarchies of the Gulf.
05:38 Now, even with all that, the character of the revolution has not changed radically, as was put by someone [inaudible]. First of all, the boundaries are shifting, and many people now fighting in those Islamic formations [?], whatever they are, are there because these are the people with the money, with the resources, with the organisation — and here is the failure of the Free Syrian Army in this regard, quite clearly. And the other forces are very messy. But the potential is still there.
06:10 And the point is: what is the worst possible scenario in Syria? That would be the continuation of the regime, obviously. And any belief that this regime is a bulwark against Islamic extremism or whatever is — as I put it recently — it's like believing that alcoholism is a prophylactic against liver disease. This is completely absurd, because these are the regimes that actually produced, or led to the proliferation of, such reactionary forces.
06:41 Now, I'm [being] indicated that I have to stop, so I'll stop here, and I apologise for not being able to take all the questions. There are other questions, but we can discuss them in the break if there is [time].
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