As the military action in Iraq winds down and the post-war configuration of forces becomes clearer, one of the countries to watch will certainly be Spain. While Blair's support for the US military adventure was hardly surprising in terms of post1945 British foreign policy, the prominent role played by Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar was rather less predictable. PATRICK BAKER offers an explanation.
Given that over 90 percent of pubC lic opinion consistently opposed
the war in Spain, demonstrations were some of the largest in Europe at around 3-4 million, and Aznar was in no position to make any significant military contribution to the conflict, some important questions are raised.
Why did Aznar's Partido Popular (P) decide to break with most of the EU to back the USA and the UK? What are they hoping to achieve in exchange for the potential disaster at the polls that they are facing next month as a result of their prowar position?
And who will benefit from the predicted defection of 5 or 6 percent of their electorate - and the massive movement that has built up on the streets?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to look at several factors: the background of the PP, now in power for the first time since 1996; Spain's historic position in relation to Europe and the USA; and the evolution of the two main left-wing parties, the Socialists (PSOE) and the United Left (IU), since the right came to power in 1996.
The Politics of the PP
The PP was born as the Popular Alliance
in the late 1970s, in the years following
Franco's death. Until the early 1990s it
made little headway in elections, largely
because the party - and particularly its
leader, Manuel Fraga - were seen as too
closely identified with the old dictatorship.
However, several factors combined to
give the new, younger leader Aznar a
chance to build up a significant following:
The Socialists became more and more
identified with corruption, were
deserted by many
disillusioned poorer workers, who had formed a significant proportion of their electorateand memories of Franco faded.
Since it has come to power one of the keystones of the PP's politics has been its resolute opposition to minority nationalism - and particularly the campaign of repres sion it has waged against the radical Basque nationalist party, Batasuna. This provides us with one of the first keys to why Aznar was so keen to be closely identified with Bush's 'war on terrorism'.
Second, the Spanish leader has clearly been thinking hard about Spain's foreign policy vis a vis the USA, NATO and the EU. As IU leader Gaspar Llamazares pointed out in parliament recently, the tactic of using an alliance with the USA to break out of international isolation is not a new one for Spain.
It was just such a manoeuvre that allowed Franco to avoid invasion at the end of the second World War - by converting Spain from an Axis ally to an anti-Communist US
ally in the
Cold War. Given that the PP leader's chances now of becoming a leader of the EU are now clearly limited, he seems to have calculated that his best chance of achieving international influence is through the USA.
However, it has been clear ever since Spain joined NATO in the mid- 1980s that a large proportion of the population are less • • • came to power. For many of the young peo ple and moderate centrists who switched from the Socialists to the PP in 1996 and 2000, the PSOE now looks more like the sort of party they voted for. So who is likely to gain from this situation? In electoral terms, the most likely winner is probably
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