weapons but could do nothing more The United States is hedging its bets, supporting China to some Thirdly there is the group that the extent but at the same time strengthening relations with states like
In June 2005, the two countries signed a "New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship" - a document that sets out the framework for relations between the states for the next decade.
The agreement says there will be closer co-operation in a number of key areas including trade in defence equipment and the transfer of "sensitive" technologies and consultation and collaboration in various security Telaled areas including Indian involvement in the US Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system and its associated Theatre Missile Defence system (TMD).
A few weeks later during a state visit to Washington by Congress Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, an accord was agreed in which the US agreed to help India develop its civilian nuclear energy sector by changing the non-proliferation agreements both within the US and internationally.
The pay back came at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy meeting in September when India voted with the US against Iran, a traditional ally.
Vanaik explained that the US divides other nuclear powers into four groups. In the first group are Britain, France and Israel - states which the US has always supported having a nuclear arsenal.
Secondly are Russia and China, where the United States opposed their initial acquisition of nuclear than complain about it. US decrees should not only not have nuclear weapons but not even the capacity to acquire them such as Iraq and Iran.
Then the fourth group is India and Pakistan, where the US attitude has been more ambivalent but to which it has ultimately reconciled itself since they are now seen as allies..
In terms of the more recent shift in relations with India, it has been strategic considerations which have driven the US's decision making.
The White House is obsessed with India that can act as a check on China. its drive for global dominance and the fundamental alliances it pursues to achieve this remain the same as during the cold war - those with Japan and with the European Union.
This is the framework into which relations with India fit - as a counterweight to the rise of China. Some argue that the US are implacably opposed to the growth in both economic and political terms, others that they are supporting China's growth because it is such a huge market for US exports.
Achin argues that the United States is hedging its bets, supporting China to some extent but at the same time strengthening relations with states like India that can act as a check on China.
Does this mean that the US are backing India against Pakistan - the aspiration of many in the Indian elite. Not at all.
As Vanaik explained in an article for Economic and Political Weekly in August 2005, "India and Pakistan serve non-substitutable US interests".
And later: "as a Hindu majority country, there is no way that India can substitute for what Muslim client regimes can provide the US in West and Central Asia. And of the 54 Muslim majority states, it is Pakistan that has the widest pool of skilled scientific personnel and educated elites; the most protessional and battle-hardened army; the one country with the bomb and whose military dominated governments have been more or less reliable allies of the US for decades - all assets the US will not casually discount.
But there are many senses in which India is more important and or reliable than Pakistan. At the political level, Pakistan remains deeply unstable as only for 11 years of the 59 years since independence has it had a civilian government.
Probably more significantly, at least at the present moment, in economic terms India is vastly more important to the US not only because of the size of its population but because the existence of a mass elite means it is one of the ten most important "emerging markets" for the US and the West.
Beyond this, the commitment to neo-liberal policies in India since the early 1990's means that there is not the fear of a protectionist response as with China or South Korea.
Though there has been a change of