Ariel Sharon's recent stroke looks likely to further destabilise an internal Israeli political scene already in ferment. Apart from the assassinated Yitzhak Rabin, only one Israeli prime minister has previously died in office, and there are no accepted procedures for this contingency.
At 77, Sharon is Israel's oldest prime minister, and he is contesting the forthcoming election as head of a party largely, if not entirely, built around his record and reputation.
Should he die or become incapacitated, his colleagues would fight bitterly for the succession; but none would have Sharon's stature and prestige, and the party would be very likely to split apart.
In such circumstances, the leaders of the rival parties would also face difficulties in winning support and establishing political legitimacy as Israel's leader.
In fact, it is likely that Sharon's death or incapacity would lead to a crisis of political legitimacy, in which the army could pose itself as the only neutral and consensual force.
Israel, like Prussia, has been described as "not a state with an army, but an army with a state". The army has rarely intervened overtly in politics, preferring to rely on politicians (most of whom have held high military positions) to act suitably, in order to preserve the image of Israel as a western-style parlamentary democracy. But a direct intervention, and even a seizure of power, can no longer be ruled out.
Indeed, an army coup agalist unpopular ponticdl figures, to "ensure national security", would be likely, in its initial stages at least, to receive widespread public support among the Israeli Jewish population.
For Palestinians, such a development would not make a huge difference. Indeed, by clarifying the nature of Israeli rule, it could even assist in bulding international support for the Palestinian struggle.