interfere in internal Syrian politics.
By being in Lebanon, the reactionary Syrian dictatorship has played to the gallery of Arab public opinion, posing itself as a "front line? state in the struggle against Israel, and getting huge subsidies from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
However when invaded Lebanon in 1982, with the strategic aim of throwing the PLO armed forces out of the country, Syrian troops sat on their hands and did not intervene, even when Beirut was bombarded.
The Bush team has seized on the growing demand for real Lebanese independence and self-determination, which conveniently kills several birds with one stone. First, the withdrawal of Syrian troops is seen as a direct blow to Hizbollah, the Shi'ite fundamentalist movement in Lebanon. Hizbollah, which maintains a large and extremely well-armed militia, is financed and protected by Syria, and has been aided in the past by Iran.
Although Hizbollah activity along the border with Israel has been at a low ebb, both Washington and Tel Aviv suspect the movement of stockpiling weapons and biding its time before opening up a new offensive across the border, perhaps when the current Israel-PLO peace process begins to go into crisis.
More important than striking a blow at Hizbollah, however, is the Bush team's plan for regime change in Syria itself, overthrowing the government of Bashar al-Assad. That regime is a degenerate remnant of post-second world By being in Lebanon, the reactionary Syrian dictatorship has played to the gallery of Arab public opinion, posing itself as a "front line' state in the struggle against Israel war Arab nationalism, and one that maintains itself in power through the army and extremely brutal security police. Nonetheless being anti-Israel and giving help to anti-Israel movements that Washington calls terrorist is a key part of the political identity of the regime, without which all remaining popular support would evaporate. US plans
Washington's plan for the whole region is now clear. It can be summarised as
a) broker a peace deal with the Palestinians, which involves minimal concessions by the Sharon government and a historic defeat for Palestinian nationalism
b) stabilise a 'democratic" government in Iraq which will not actively oppose a permanent US military presence or a decisive US role in the
c) overthrow the governments in Syria and Iraq, and replace them with proWestern 'democratic' governments.
For the moment the campaign against Iran revolves around the accusation that the country is developing nuclear weapons. Strong rumours persist of US Special Forces entering the country to spy out nuclear targets for a possible US or Israeli military attack. But it is very doubtful that the US has decided on regime change in Syria or Iran by military means.
A political campaign on democracy, capable of linking up with economic elites and popular opposition to authoritarian rule, is a much less problematic solution - if it can be achieved. Of course, as the US campaign develops, military action against Tehran and Damascus remains a possibility if all else fails.
But developments in Iraq are actually at the centre of this whole process. If the insurgency persists and a proUS government cannot be stabilised, the situation in the whole region will be much less amenable to US dominasuffered worse defeats.
The key Shiite leader in the country Ali al-Sistani may well try to manoeuvre with the US and give tacit consent to continued American presence, in exchange for clerical dominance over 'civil society'.
is extremely doubtful whether this can work; opposition to the US presence is overwhelming.
That is the irresolvable contradiction that the US occupation faces, and why the insurgency will continue. Syrian regime vulnerable
The intractable US position in Iraq does not mean that it cannot be successful in Lebanon and Syria itself. Two factors are key here.
Despite the reliance of the regime on the army and security apparatus, it is widely rumoured that the political elite is split over whether to finish off all the old trappings of Arab nationalism, and go boldly forward to take their place in the community of neoliberal nations.
Such an outcome would in all likelihood appeal to Syria's capitalist class, eager for openings to the world market and an influx of foreign capital as a way out of permanent economic crisis.
Second, there have been recent signs that the regime is losing its political grip. During the last Iraq war there were 'unofficial' demonstrations against the US attack, something unheard of for more than 30 years, when all public political expressions had to be approved by the regime.
In September 2000, members of Syria's intelliSocialist
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