hundreds of thousands
blockading the centre
of Kiev shook the
entire world, which watched the unfolding
events with
astonishment and
alarm. ALEKSANDR
BUZGALIN is a
professor and chief
editor of the Moscow social and political journal, Alternativy, which recently held a seminar in Kiev on the topic, "Ukraine: Lessons for Russia". More than fifty people took part, from professors of political science and leaders of left parties to young activists from the square. Below Buzgalin looks at the questions that were considered. Three basic views of the December events were put forward, characterising it as:
1. A revolt by citizens against the bureaucraticcriminal regime, a popular democratic revolution - if not socio-economic in character, then at least political. This view was argued by young activists of the Socialist Party, living and working on the square.
2. A redivision of power between oligarchic clans, with opposition oligarchs making use of popular discontent for their own ends. Espousing this view were several leftwing professors and activists of the Communist Party of Ukraine.
3. conflict between Ukraine's pro-American west, supported by the European Union and the US, and the pro-Russian east, traditionally linked to Russia by economic and cultural bonds. This was the line put forward by representatives of the Russophile intelligentsia and a some Stalinist-Communists.
So who was right?
As a result of the so-called market reforms and privatisation in Ukraine (as in other countries of the former Soviet Union), a highly peculiar social and economic system came into being. At its centre are clan-corporate groups, consisting of a complex, informally linked totality of priva tised enterprises and financial institutions, along with lobbying structures that represent them in the organs of state power.
Because of intermingling between the top levels of the clans, state officials (both in Kiev and locally), and criminal gangs, an oligarchic. bureaucratic system has arisen in Ukraine. This system is dominated by informal institutions, operating according to "understandings" between the authorities, the oligarchs and criminal eleVirtually everyone I spoke to in tent city stressed that they came to protest against this model of criminal-bureaucratic power.
Gradually the power of the clans was imposed on all the main social structures of society. Life has depended on the whims of the authorities and the oligarchs, who have paid
or neglected to pay workers
wages, persecuted activists in
protest movements and determined the scale of the bribes and protection money
extracted from businesses.
Naturally, the most influential clans were those which became intertwined with the former executive power (ie with President Kuchma and Prime Minister Yanukovich), and which in regional terms were centred on the south-east and Kiev. But opposition clans could not fail to arise.
As most of the activists on the square understood, several of these directly supported Yushchenko's election campaign, and probably financed it. To a degree, but by no both your houses" means completely, these groups are linked to the economy of the western regions.
The class structure in Ukraine (as in other parts of the former Soviet Union) includes strata of small and middle bourgeois (primarily in the commercial sphere, along with a narrow but active layer of "professionals". The latter are "advanced" employ. ees of large commercial structures, owning computers, and speaking English and The Communist Party of Ukraine took a position of "a plague on (with massive reservations) in favour of Yanukovich.
have qualifications in economics, law or computer sci- ence, and their salaries are
high by Ukrainian standards.
The intelligentsia
extremely diverse. The "rankand-file" intelligentsia, consisting of teachers, doctors,
engineers etc, is very poor.
They are hostile to the power
of the bureaucracy and the
clans.
Ukraine has seen the gradual rise of a pro-Western intelligentsia current, partly as a
result of real sympathy for the
democratic forms of government in Europe (in comparison atleast to the regimes of
Kuchma and Putin), and
partly due to relatively prosperousity resulting from
American and Western
European grants, fellowships
and so on. This section of the
intelligentsia mainly
Ukrainian-speaking.
The working class is also
highly differentiated, depending on the type of enterprise.
It is a long way off emerging
from the semi-feudal, semicriminal entanglements of
extra-economic coercion.
It is not fully aware of the contradictions between its interests and the interests of the bosses (a line of argument which still prevails involves joint action by management and workers to save "our" crisis-ridden enterprise - an enterprise which long ago became completely alien so far as the workers are concerned).
Ukrainian workers wedded to their places of residence and to their dachas, displaying post-Soviet attachment to "their" factories, and so forth. This accounts for the weakness of their class consciousness.
In the last few years the Ukrainian has begun gradually climbing out of the appalling depression to , while a number of Stalinist groups came out which "liberal" reforms had consigned it. GDP had declined by more than 50 per cent, with an even greater fall in industrial output. The incomes of the majority of the population dropped more than 40 per cent, leading to the formation of a massive layer of impoverished and lumpen elements.
The economic recovery began particularly in sectors of industry directly tied to Russia; partly as a reflection of Russian economic growth.
Most of thistook place in the
south and east of Ukraine.
The beginning of economic
growth coincided with a powerful and uneven influx of
Russian capital; with various
Russian oligarchic groups
linked to particular Ukrainian
clans. Russia provides deliveries of cheap oil and gas, and
also orders for parts of industrial production in the southNot long before the
elections, pensions and other
social benefits increased..
Large numbers of residents of the east are bound quite tightly to Russia in economic terms; making frequent trips to earn money in there or work in enterprises that depend on Russian orders.
1 The overwhelming majority of the population in these regions (about half of Ukraine's citizens) alC Russian-speakers, and are tired of the subordinate position of the Russian language. Yanukovich supports closer relations with Russia and defends the rights of the Russian-speaking population.
do HOE generally believe Yushchenko's promises to preserve their rights, and look with concern to the Baltic countries, where the civil rights of Russian-speakers have been severely limited.
Among Yushchenko's supporters, including those who were on the square, there are more than a few Ukrainian nationalists. In western Ukraine Yushchenko was supported even by semi-fascist organisations, from which the opposition did not decisively distance itself. This repelled large numbers of people away from the opposition.
During the December conflict the socialists, mainly of Ukrainian-speaking members of the intelligentsia, supported Yushchenko on the basis of the need to fight for democracy. The Socialist Party of Ukraine is now reminiscent of the Western European social democrats of the first half of the twentieth century
The Communist Party of Ukraine took a position of "a plague on both yeur houses", while a number of Stalinist groups came out (with massive reservations) in favour of Continued overleaf,
pages 16-17
page 16 of the scan
(from page 15) Yanukovich. The small number of Trotskyist and anarchist organizations, and the independent democraticleft intelligentsia (to the left of the social democrats) generally made very little impact. On the whole, they supported the democratic slogans of the square, without giving their backing to Yushchenko.
Things are further complicated by the struggle between the West (with certain differences between the US, pursuing an actively expansionist geopolitical course, and Western Europe, with a more moderate position) and Russia for influence on Ukraine.
The West promises Ukraine a road into NATO and the European Union, along with economic aid. Western Ukraine, the Ukrainianspeaking intelligentsia, and significant elements of small and middle business support this, along with some of the clans, though not the strongest ones.
Russia's cultural influence has been weakened partly because of the diminished attractiveness of the Russian model of development. Some Ukrainians fear Russian expansionism and of the loss of Ukrainian independence if the pro-Russian line prevails. Yushchenko is seen as leading the cause of rapprochement with the West, and as a guarantee against these dangers.
This is the context behind the December events, when approximately equal numbers voted for the two candiates. Yanukovich, the then prime minister and candidate of the authorities, was supported by overwhelming majorities in south-eastern Ukraine and also by Russia. Yushchenko, who little more than five years ago held high posts in the government, drew support from Ukraine's western provinces, as well as from the European Union, the US and Poland..
Yushchenko refused to accept the results of the second round. According to official figures, Yanukovich had won with a majority of 3 per cent. Claiming that the elections had been rigged, the opposition called on people to come into the streets of Kiev, and to Independence Square.
So began the most powerful act of mass civil disobedience in the history of the former Soviet Union, lasting more than two weeks. Some two million people came from every province (mainly, of course, from the west), from cities, towns and even villages.
Pro-Yushchenko political forces were directly invloved in organising the demonstrations, with considerable sums of money and a professional apparatus. The highly professional organisation was evident in the choice of speakers, the press work, the image of the leaders, the organisation of concerts, the setting up of tent city, the transport and accommodation of participants from other regions.
They were supported by a number of oligarchs (and members of the middle bourgeoisie) who had financed Yushchenko's election campaign, and helped fund the actions. The West did not just sympathise with Yushchenko, but also provided direct media assistance and political help. Sections of the Western media also carried reports of financial support.
But no public relations apparatus, no political campaign experts, can bring such masses of people onto the streets. Nor can they force people to spend long hours in the cold over two weeks, and to do this with real enthusiasm.
The square represented a socio-economic shift far more profound than mere protest action carried out to support an opposition candidate by clans outside the ruling group. In my view, the nature of these events can be revealed only through the analysis of a contradiction in the position of the masses.
On the one hand, most of the workers and a section of the petty and even middle bourgeoisie in our countries are tired of living on promIt was only after two weeks that many (but
not, it seems, the majority) came to believe in their own strength, and were
able to say: if Yushchenko does not fulfil our wishes, we will come back to the
square. ises, and have an objective interest in smashing this type of capitalism. Moreover, even while lacking clearly thought-out programme of even a bourgeois-democratic type, they are subjectively ready to participate in changing the state of affairs.
But these oppressed layers are incapable of carrying out such actions independently. They lack confidence in their strength, and have no structures of self-organisation which in practice are sufficiently strong, for the masses. with their help, to have a real chance of victory. (The reasons for this is a different though fundamentally impor tant question, which I address elsewhere).
In Russia the masses mostly grumble vaguely with no opportunity to realise their potential for protest though the strikes and occupations from 1998 to 2001 showed that this potential exists). In Ukraine a different situation has arisen. The contradictions between two rival ruling groups of approximately equal strength have sharpened dramatically.
Meanwhile, the conflict between two geopolitical forces of more or less equal weight (the West and Russia) has grown more acute.
Thus an objective chance appeared for the masses to take independent action. When the opposition decided to turn to the people, the people came to believe that their time had come - that they were capable of exercising real power.
The events on the square bore certain features of political revolution (though not of social revolution - no-one was threatening change of system). The legitimacy of the existing system was shattered by a sort of "extra-legal" outburst.
The force carrying out the changes was of a truly massive character. There WCIC demands for a radical change in the model of political power, an atmosphere of a "festival of the oppressed".
People went to the square not initially because they believed in their own strength, but in the strength and potential of Yushchenko and of his backers. Some understood that he could betray them, and some did not.
It was only after two weeks that many (but not, it seems, the majority) came to believe in their own strength, and were able to say: if Yushchenko does not fulfil our wishes, we will come back to the square.
Will they come? So far there is no answer, since questions remains unresolved: what will be the real result, who will ultimately come to power, and will the people who came onto the streets obtain what they were ready to fight for, and fought for, on the square?
If "Yushchenko and Company" come to power, they will quickly betray the interests of those who propelled them to office.
More than likely, the outcome of the mass actions will consist of limited bourgeoisdemocratic reforms (which have already begun with the adoption of a package of laws transforming Ukraine from a presidential to a parliamentary republic), and a redistribution of power among the clans.
Why? Because the citizens who came out onto the streets and squares did not create effective forms of self-organisation, while the political and social organisations that were supposed to defend tworkers interests behaved extremely passively. There were some exceptions, mainly young activists, from the Socialist Party and other organisations. Most, however, took the halfsqueamish view that these were not their supporters and that there was nothing there for them to do.
Despite being a Marxist, earlier I used terms like
"citizens" and "masses". I had serious reasons for this "forgetfulness". Almost all social groupings in post-Soviet countries have an objective interest in anti-oligarchic movements, whether of a revolutionary or reformist character.
The exceptions are the authorities; the oligarchs and layers of the petty bourgeoisie who collude with them; criminals; and lumpen elements fostered by the regime and the oligarchs. The oligarchs may also draw support from managers and workers of privileged enterprises associated with the ruling clans.
All the rest - no. Workers, the rank-and-file intelligentsia, the majority of professionals, and the small and even middle bourgeoisie in our countries have a greater objective interest in a democratic bourgeois system than in a semifeudal oligarchic model of peripheral capitalism.
page 17 of the scan
The rank and file activists have acquired something far greater - a priceless experience of real self-organisation and political struggle, an experience showing that they are a force able in principle to change the social system.
The former provides the bourgeoisie and the layers serving it with great opportunities for enrichment amid guarantees of stability, order, and property rights. Democracy in general (and freedom of speech in particular) is vital to the existence and functioning of the intelligentsia.
For the working class, breaking the power of the oligarchs opens up possibilities for self-organisation and for using democratic methods to engage in legal struggle for better pay and working conditions, social welfare etc -le for the goals traditionally advanced by leftists as a minimum programme, and by social democrats and labourists as a maximum.
The force which provided the political leadership on the square was the small and middle national bourgeoisie, together with layers with similar basic interests, ie professionals and the WHO KE prosperous intelligentsia. But the most active, enthusiastic fighters for the victory on the square were the rank and file intelligentsia, young people (above all students), and workers. Through their sweat and energy, the bourgeois and "opposition" elements in Ukraine are coming to power, sidelining (but not definitively defeating) the old oligarchic-bureaucratic regime.
In the concrete circumstances, the workers and rankand-file intelligentsia lag considerably in the formation of their consciousness, and lack developed forms of political representation.
Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie and its supporters have proceeded much further in developing a consciousness of their interests and self-organisation.
In Leninist terms, the Ukrainian bourgeoisie is actively transforming itself into a "class for itself", unlike the workers, who for the present remain principally a "class in themselves".
But the bourgeois strata have never and will never be a sufficient force to carry out mass actions, but transter the main burden of popular struggle to the "lower orders". This determined the disposition of forces -On Indepen-dence Square.
The main winners from the mass actions will be other oligarchs and various elements of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie. The intelligentsia and workers will at best receive a certain expansion of democratic freedoms.
But the rank and file activists have acquired something far greater - a priceless experience of real self-organisation and political struggle, an experience showing that they are a force able in principle to change the social system.
Independence Square was not just a massive, democratic act of civil disobedience. It became the prototype of peaceful popular-democratic (anti-oligarchic) revolution that is so necessary to the Ukrainian people.
So why could the supporters of anti-oligarchic change on both sides not unite on the basis of a common democratic platform, and begin a struggle against both sets of oligarchs and bureaucrats, the proWestern and the pro-Russian?
Because the workers have been unable (yet?) to act in the present crisis as an independent socio-political force. They have acted to implement an alien will; only partly becoming independent agents of social change.
Sections of the left were right to denounceboth candidates, but should have been much more involved in the work on the square, lending support to the real actions of the citizens there, and explaining to them how and why Yushchenko would most likely sell them out if they were not independent in their
It is too soon to draw definitive conclusions, but some lessons should be drawn out.
Mass acts of civil disobedience, possessing certain traits of political revolution and aimed at the smashing of oligarchic-bureaucratic power, are possible in the post-Soviet context.
The class consciousness and organisation of layers of the national bourgeoisie in these countries is developing taster than those of the working class.
In terms of their class content, the mass actions of citizens have been exclusively bourgeois. Thus their democratic nature is not consistent enough. So long as the rank-and-file intelligentsia and the workers remain weak, the medium and small bourgeoisie will always lose out to the oligarchs, and ultimately, consistent democratic reforms (even bourgeois-democratic ones) will not be implemented.
This will require unity between workers and others on the basis of combining the struggle of the left (within the framework of a minimum programme and the leftcentre in the struggle for a consistently democratic and socially-oriented system.
For mass action by citizens against the authorities to take place, a crisis of the regime is needed, along with the presence of a powerful alternative force able to arouse civic action (and partly, to organise it as well).
But unless this force is consistently democratic, resting on the self-organisation of the oppressed, it will ultimately be used by a different ("opposition") layer of the elite. Any genuine mass action, however, will yield invaluable experience of self-organisation, showing that citizens are capable of solidarity and the independent forging of history.
Independence Square, for all its painful contradictions (which constitute the very essence of these events), was a festival of the Ukrainian people and of all its friends. Whatever happens now, this experience will not vanish without trace.
11 December 2004