Gearoid O Loingsigh
When Plan Colombia was first announced by President Clinton, three different versions were put forward, each of which
had a different emphasis depending on the audience to which they were presented. The version presented to the EU
was edited so that social spending came to the fore of the document - rather than
being the afterthought it seemed to be in the US version.
However, all versions had one thing in common. They clearly described the plan as an anti-narcotics strategy for the region. Many critics pointed out that it was a counter-insurgency plan designed to increase the US's role in the region and that the anti-narcotics strategy involved had failed everywhere else.
No sooner was the ink dry than a subtle "shift" began to manifest itself. The US explained it could not separate the "war on drugs" from the needs of counter insurgency operations. The pressure for this came both from within the Colombian elites and also the Colombian armed forces that wanted to use the military hardware they were being offered openly.
The "change in direction" was already well underway before September II. Nobody in the US establishment lost a second in taking advantage of George Bush's declared "window of opportunity". Colin Powell had to cut short his own visit to Latin America because of the attacks, but before leaving declared ominously that the guerrillas of both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN) could represent a threat to US interests.
These sentiments were echoed in Colombia, as the regime saw an opportunity to avoid the debate on its own lack of democracy and the bloody dirty war it was waging together with its paramilitary protégés. The focus instead became the need to take part in the international war on terrorism.
The US State Department already listed the FARC and ELN as terrorist organisations. After September Il, the EU declared the FARC (and a number of other organisations in other countries) to be terrorists - leaving the ELN out for the moment.
Plan Colombia was renamed as the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) giving the US the right not only to arm the Colombian military but to extend this to other Andean countries such as Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. Even sections of the Venezuelan police receive military aid under the initiative.
Plan Colombia and the "war on drugs" had seen the US establish a number of military bases and radar stations throughout Latin America. Under ARI, the US aims to extend the uses to which those can be put beyond the war on drugs'.
The election of the extreme right wing candidate Alvaro Uribe in May 2003 was the icing on the cake for the US government. Not only had Congress been persuaded to actively back a counter insurgency strategy in Colombia, but the country was now run by a president whose electoral programme stated that he would, to put it colloquially, stuff the FARC. US ambassador, Anne Patterson, publicly congratulated Uribe before the opposition had conceded defeat.
During his election campaign, Uribe had capitalised on the breakdown in the peace process with the FARC by saying the government had gone soft on the "terrorists" and that if elected he would take the fight to them. This struck a popular chord amongst Colombia's middle class who had plan Colomola pian de muerte thought the war was far away in the coun tryside and now feared its increasing spread into urban areas.
Since the election, Uribe has set out to increase the size of the military by extending military service to sectors that were previously exempt and through increased professionalisation. Alongside this tactic, financed mainly through tax increases, he has begun legalising his old pals, the paramilitaries.
When he was Governor of the department of Antiquia in the mid-1990s he set up a series of rural security cooperatives called Convivir (which literally means to cohabit!). These spread throughout the department at the same rate as the paramilitaries. They were legal cover through which the paramilitaries could be armed and openly gain access to military bases They provided perfect justification for their open presence in any town.
The number of trade unionists, farmers and human rights workers murdered shot up as did the number of the disappeared and internally displaced. Uribe's wings were eventually clipped by the Constitutional Court, which declared the Convivir illegal. Uribe created a social wasteland in Antiquia and also forced the guerrillas to pull back.
As president he wants to repeat the experiment on a national scale. This model
NO ASESIWARAI Devastation in agriculture caused by US "aerial fumigation"
was first implemented in Guatemala in the
1980s and 1990s.
Uribe has set up what are euphemistically called "peasant soldiers" and called for
20,000 volunteers, a number strangely
equivalent to the number of paramilitaries
of the United Self-Defence Forces of
Colombia (AUC). Local peasants will be
called upon or press-ganged into taking on a military role in areas where the
Colombian state does not currently have
complete control.
However, unlike his Guatemalan colleagues, Uribe plans to militarise all aspects
of society. He has repeatedly declared that there can be no neutral figures, as the para. militaries themselves have always claimed Not surprisingly the head of the AUC declared Uribe's election a "victory for democracy".
Uribe is intolerant towards those who do not wish to participate in his fight against the guerrillas, Laws have been introduced forcing civilians to collaborate with the police and army. How he deals with oppo. sition is evidenced by the 201 trade unionists murdered in Colombia in 2002 against 235 in the whole world!). Each year the total number of deaths runs into the thousands.
The strategy of the US and of the .... •• It has become a cliché to point out that US imperialism is influenced by the location of mineral wealth and natural resources. Colombia is no exception.
Colombian state is not purely military.
What is the point of a military victory if you
can't reap the rewards? It has become a
cliché to point out that US imperialism is
influenced by the location of mineral
wealth and natural resources. Colombia is
no exception. It is an enormously wealthy
country, with large oil reserves, and some
of the largest gold deposits in the world. It
is a major producer of coal, emeralds,
bananas and coffee.
The US has long been pushing for liberal
isation in the region to allow US companies
unfettered access to markets and resources. This process began in Colombia
in the early 1990s and really took off under the Samper regime (1994 - 1998). By the time Pastrana (1998 - 2002) signed up to Plan Colombia the economy was already opened up
Plan Colombia itself contained economic proposals around privatization and trade. Some of these were quite general but others were very specific. Specific demands were made to privatise state industries engaged in the generation and supply of electricity.
The privatised companies ISA and ISAGEN have expanded throughout Latin America and have already bought up the electricity grids of Peru and Bolivia. All of this is in preparation for that other grand plan of the US, Plan Puebla-Panama. The US aimed to create a network that would generate electricity in the area between Puebla, Mexico in the north and Panama in the south with the aim of exporting it to the US/Mexican border and beyond.
With the privatization and expansion of ISA and ISAGEN, the US will eventually be able to export electricity from Bolivia to the US. Plan Puebla Panama is essentially the infrastructural plan for the Free Trade Area of the Americas.
Alongside the military component of these programmes, the US has developed a whole range of social programmes to be administered by USAID. The EU has developed its own range of social programmes for Colombia that it claims are independent of the US. However, whilst these are not arms programmes, they are strategic plans that fit into the overall aim of Plan Colombia i.e. the destruction of any oppo
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