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A rash political operation that divides rather than unites the Continent’s communist and anti-capitalist left forces
The fragile illusion of the “European party ”
The fragile illusion of the “European party
Just six of the eleven signatory parties to the Berlin Appeal — out of the more than sixty that could have been involved — announce in Athens the convocation of a “founding congress” that might be held May 8-9, 2004, in Rome
by Fausto Sorini [ National Bureau of the PRC (Italy) ]
1) The failure of the Athens summit last February 14-15 — called by Synaspismos on the eve of Greece’s political elections, in the (illusory) hope of gaining an advantage in the electoral competition with the communists of the KKE — indicates a profound crisis and a disconcerting fragility in the project at hand, something about which we should all reflect responsibly. A summit marked by the absence of the major “founding” leaders of the new “European party,” who were to have spoken at a stadium (an event cancelled at the last moment); their participation had been confirmed up until the day before — a minor mystery whose details are not yet clear — which, by a last-minute decision, saw the non-participation of the Communist Refoundation’s own leader and the complete absence of any representation of the PCF and of Izquierda Unida. Also absent were the Slovak CP and Cyprus’ Akel, while the communists from the Czech Republic (present with an observer who is not part of any leadership body and who was specifically ordered not to sign any document and not to participate in any public initiative, so as not to interfere in the Greek election campaign) officially announced that their party will not participate in any founding congress prior to the European elections (1).
A summit marked by the absence of the major “founding” leaders of the new “European party,” who were to have spoken at a stadium (an event cancelled at the last moment); their participation had been confirmed up until the day before — a minor mystery whose details are not yet clear — which, by a last-minute decision, saw the non-participation of the Communist Refoundation’s own leader and the complete absence of any representation of the PCF and of Izquierda Unida.
Also absent were the Slovak CP and Cyprus’ Akel, while the communists from the Czech Republic (present with an observer who is not part of any leadership body and who was specifically ordered not to sign any document and not to participate in any public initiative, so as not to interfere in the Greek election campaign) officially announced that their party will not participate in any founding congress prior to the European elections (1).
So the only people present were representatives of Synaspismos, the PRC, the German PDS, and Lattvia’s Human Rights Party. Despite this, a communiqué was issued (its representativeness speaks for itself – half of the promoters were missing) which, while admitting that the drafts of the Political Manifesto and the Charter prepared by the “initiative group” (the promoters) must still be approved by it (we know, for example, that there are still fundamental differences on the Charter) (2) – formally announced that the Athens summit decided to hold the founding congress of the “Party of the European Left” on May 18-19 in Rome (3). And it asks that each interested party “send a delegation consisting of 12 people based on the gender quota.” And this without any leading party body having decided anything whatsoever in this regard (it smacks of surreal socialism!).
And this without any leading party body having decided anything whatsoever in this regard (it smacks of surreal socialism!).
We will see how all this will end. Let’s take a step backward and try to reconstruct the matter from the start.
Let’s take a step backward and try to reconstruct the matter from the start.
2) The topic of the “European party” arose in February 2003, technically and institutionally speaking, with approval by the European parliament of a regulation on the “Status and funding of European political parties” implementing certain articles in the Maastricht and Nice Treaties relating to the role of political parties in the EU.
In order to make use of funding without creating political complications for the parties of the GUE-NGL (European Unified Left – Nordic Green Left: the group in the European parliament that includes the deputies of the communist and alternative-left parties of the EU), it would have been sufficient, as was initially planned and accepted by all , to opt for a technical solution that would have allowed registering the charter of a “fictitious” party in order to be able to have access to the funds provided (millions of euro); this would allow the true function of a new European political subject to be performed by a structured and permanent coordination of all interested parties, on a continental scale , independently of EU regulations and regardless of whether the parties belong to EU countries.
And for that matter, that is the way it was for years, with the GUE-NGL and allied parties (including those without European delegates but politically similar, and not necessarily members of the EU, as was the case for years with Cyprus’ AKEL and Norway’s Socialist Left Party).
Consider also that the European Parliament’s regulations do not require “European parties” to register with the name of “party,” so that it would have been enough to register as “European Unified Left” (the name of the GUE), avoiding formal and substantive disputes that would inevitably arise from the very definition of “European party.”
3) These “European parties,” in contrast with the role envisioned for political parties in the national constitutions (where they are the free expression of civil society and not emanations of the State), are instead bound to the institutions of the EU. Therefore it is the European parliament that approves their existence, determines whether their charter complies with the principles of “liberal democracy” on which the EU is founded, and hence that ultimately can decide to dissolve them if they do not “respect the fundamental proposals of the Union regarding freedom, democracy, human rights, fundamental liberties and standards of law...in accordance with the EU’s Treaty and Charter of Fundamental Rights.”
Therefore it is the European parliament that approves their existence, determines whether their charter complies with the principles of “liberal democracy” on which the EU is founded, and hence that ultimately can decide to dissolve them if they do not “respect the fundamental proposals of the Union regarding freedom, democracy, human rights, fundamental liberties and standards of law...in accordance with the EU’s Treaty and Charter of Fundamental Rights.”
I would note that – if worse comes to worst – policies of solidarity with Cuba or with countries where different criteria of “democracy” are in force compared with those of the EU, could be grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the “European party” that practiced them; and likewise for a line of solidarity with the Iraqi resistance or with Colombia’s FARC, which the EU calls “terrorist organisations”; or for the charter of a European party which, for example, refers to Leninism, which is to say to principles incompatible with “liberal democracy”.
These “rights of interference” do not bother the dominant parties that fall within the compatibilities of the EU system, nor those “alternative left” parties which, while critical of current EU policies, do not call into question the basic assumptions and do not trespass on such “compatibilities.” Whereas there are communist, revolutionary and anti-imperialist parties with a certain established profile and a “not very compatible” international status that have more than one reason not to expect any “benevolent tolerance” from the dominant groups in this European Union and from the “bipartisan” mechanisms which, on fundamental and systemic issues , dominate with a huge majority the current European parliament, as we saw for example with the Cuba affair (4).
Whereas there are communist, revolutionary and anti-imperialist parties with a certain established profile and a “not very compatible” international status that have more than one reason not to expect any “benevolent tolerance” from the dominant groups in this European Union and from the “bipartisan” mechanisms which, on fundamental and systemic issues , dominate with a huge majority the current European parliament, as we saw for example with the Cuba affair (4).
Therefore, and I again cite the EU regulation, “if the European parliament judges, by a majority of its members, that the condition is no longer met, the charter of the political party in question shall be removed from the register...and all funding suspended...; funding issued inappropriately shall be returned...and adequate financial sanctions may be imposed using an identical procedure.” (5)
4) As we see, these “European parties” enjoy “limited sovereignty” and are in many respects dependent on EU institutions, which are not neutral but give shape to a process of neo-imperialist concentration of European capitalism in global competition.
The nature of the political party is changing. And for this reason as well a technical solution would be preferable, one aimed at getting funding; so that we would then operate in full autonomy – politically speaking – to construct a European political subject, on continental bases, that is capable of effective, permanent and structured coordination, not bound by EU institutions. For example, a Forum of the Sao Paolo type, including all of the Latin American anti-imperialist left. A forum open to the communist and anti-capitalist left parties of the entire European continent, associated with social movements and struggle, not only of the EU countries. (6)
The nature of the political party is changing.
And for this reason as well a technical solution would be preferable, one aimed at getting funding; so that we would then operate in full autonomy – politically speaking – to construct a European political subject, on continental bases, that is capable of effective, permanent and structured coordination, not bound by EU institutions.
For example, a Forum of the Sao Paolo type, including all of the Latin American anti-imperialist left.
A forum open to the communist and anti-capitalist left parties of the entire European continent, associated with social movements and struggle, not only of the EU countries.
It is objected that the formula of “coordination” among parties, in the ten years of experience of the GUE, has proved to be an ineffective formula, incapable of producing true mass campaigns coordinated on a European scale. And no one wants to understand that the origin of this ineffectiveness, which is real, is not the result of organisational formulas but of basic political differences, which in many cases have divided the parties of the GUE (and I cite the single example of the war against Yugoslavia, where certain parties, while criticising the military intervention, were part of belligerent governments [France, Italy], while others were in the opposition and outspokenly against the war, while still others [I am thinking of certain Nordic groups, which I will not cite out of decency] were actually supportive of the appropriateness of Nato’s “humanitarian” intervention “against the Milosevic regime”). Is anyone ready to believe that if all these forces had been united into a single “European party” the paralysis of the joint initiative would have been less extreme?
And no one wants to understand that the origin of this ineffectiveness, which is real, is not the result of organisational formulas but of basic political differences, which in many cases have divided the parties of the GUE (and I cite the single example of the war against Yugoslavia, where certain parties, while criticising the military intervention, were part of belligerent governments [France, Italy], while others were in the opposition and outspokenly against the war, while still others [I am thinking of certain Nordic groups, which I will not cite out of decency] were actually supportive of the appropriateness of Nato’s “humanitarian” intervention “against the Milosevic regime”).
Is anyone ready to believe that if all these forces had been united into a single “European party” the paralysis of the joint initiative would have been less extreme?
Conversely, a non-party body like the Sao Paolo Forum, which encompasses more than a hundred political groups and is coordinated on a rotating basis by a restricted group, has demonstrated that it is capable of pushing – when there is political agreement – mass campaigns on a continental scale, like that against FTAA (the free-trade agreement supported by the United States that would make the Americas one great ultra-liberalist market, subordinate to U.S. capitalism.
5) We too often forget that the EU is not all of Europe.
But while the European conservative, social-democratic and Green parties work throughout the entire continent (7), Russia included (Gorbachev is a man who works in close contact with the socialist International), as do the more farsighted bourgeoisies (consider the French-German axis and the search for convergence with Russia), the communist and (some) alternative-left parties operate as if the Berlin Wall still stood and ignore the other part of Europe.
And yet the major communist and anti-capitalist left parties are found in the East, in the Czech Republic, in the European republics of the former USSR, but they are systematically excluded from the unifying processes of the European left, based on vetoes of an ideological and anti-communist nature. Vetoes which have come especially (but not only) from the parties of the Nordic Green Left, but which the other parties of the GUE, with the sole exception of the Greek (KKE) and Portuguese (PCP) communists, are guilty of sustaining passively, or of accepting silently without too much anxiety, for more than ten years (8).
Vetoes which have come especially (but not only) from the parties of the Nordic Green Left, but which the other parties of the GUE, with the sole exception of the Greek (KKE) and Portuguese (PCP) communists, are guilty of sustaining passively, or of accepting silently without too much anxiety, for more than ten years (8).
Consider further that there is a parliamentary group in the Council of Europe (a body that includes delegations from the national parliaments of all the European countries, not just the EU) that is also called GUE, which includes not only the parties of the European parliament’s GUE but also communist and leftist representatives from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldavia. It would be enough to get this GUE-2 to function, and there would be a fine political and institutional venue in which to coordinate all the forces on a continental basis, without precluding anyone. Except that the political will has been and still is lacking on the part of certain forces of the left in Western Europe to move in this direction. But there is a will to proceed in forced stages to found and structure a type of “European party” that does not leave out a majority of the communist parties of the East and West but creates profound splits among the parties of the GUE-NGL (divided into at least four parts) and within some of them (9).
It would be enough to get this GUE-2 to function, and there would be a fine political and institutional venue in which to coordinate all the forces on a continental basis, without precluding anyone.
Except that the political will has been and still is lacking on the part of certain forces of the left in Western Europe to move in this direction.
But there is a will to proceed in forced stages to found and structure a type of “European party” that does not leave out a majority of the communist parties of the East and West but creates profound splits among the parties of the GUE-NGL (divided into at least four parts) and within some of them (9).
6) Let us examine briefly the political-identity geography of the parties of the GUE-NGL and the four “coalitions” that have been shaping up, arising not only from differing assessments of the “European party,” an issue that is in the final analysis “superstructural,” but from different strategic frameworks of analysis and proposal with respect to the European Union and the prospects for “another Europe.”
- The first coalition includes parties that push — albeit with differing means and intensity — for a formal founding of the new “Party of the European Left,” and that seem willing — with uncertainty and hesitation, especially in the leadership of the PCF — to proceed quickly even if that causes divisions. As “head group,” this coalition includes the leadership of Izquierda Unida, , German PDS andCommunist Refoundation..
As “head group,” this coalition includes the leadership of Izquierda Unida, , German PDS andCommunist Refoundation..
These four parties (mistakenly called “Eurocommunist,” even though, with the exception of PDS, they are far removed from that history) are in various ways going through internal processes of identity change. These processes are not homogeneous but certainly have in common — and I am trying to summarise without caricaturising — for some (IU, PDS) an explicit and declared disengagement from their communist identity, for others (especially theCommunist Refoundation) a “break” with Leninism and with a series of “classical references” to the so-called “20 th century Marxism.” They are the ones that provide the “sign” and the “perspective” for the identity of the “Party of the European Left.”
These processes are not homogeneous but certainly have in common — and I am trying to summarise without caricaturising — for some (IU, PDS) an explicit and declared disengagement from their communist identity, for others (especially theCommunist Refoundation) a “break” with Leninism and with a series of “classical references” to the so-called “20 th century Marxism.”
They are the ones that provide the “sign” and the “perspective” for the identity of the “Party of the European Left.”
Today IU calls itself an “eco-socialist” group, and the independent role of the communists of the SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTY has grown weaker and weaker over the years, becoming an internal component rather than a party that works with society with its own independent relationship.
The German PDS has for some time called itself a “socialist party,” “neither communist nor social-democratic.”
Part of the current majority of the PCF leadership, together with the “refounder” component, is aiming at dissolving the PCF into a new “radical coalition,” a sort of French-style Izquierda Unida.
The debate in the COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION is familiar to readers of this journal, and there is no doubt that it is strongly identity-centred and, in the initiative of its secretary, points toward rupture and discontinuity with the communist, Italian and International tradition.
The parties that join this “head group” are marginal in terms of numbers: the Austrian CP (0.xx% in electoral terms); the Greek Synaspismos (2-3%), which also identifies itself as eco-socialist; the Estonian Social-Democratic Labour Party (0.xx%); the Democratic Left of the Czech Republic (0.xx%), a sort of “Occhettian” mini-split from the Czech CP by those who wanted to change the name communist ; the Luxembourg Left (one out of 60 deputies in the last national elections), a minuscule coalition of various components with a strong internal Trotskyite current.
The parties that join this “head group” are marginal in terms of numbers:
the Austrian CP (0.xx% in electoral terms); the Greek Synaspismos (2-3%), which also identifies itself as eco-socialist; the Estonian Social-Democratic Labour Party (0.xx%); the Democratic Left of the Czech Republic (0.xx%), a sort of “Occhettian” mini-split from the Czech CP by those who wanted to change the name communist ; the Luxembourg Left (one out of 60 deputies in the last national elections), a minuscule coalition of various components with a strong internal Trotskyite current.
Beyond the identity profiles, these new political formations are the strategic and political-programming expression of two important convergences: a search in the current context for governing alliances with the social-democratic parties of their respective countries, and acceptance of the European Union as the necessary strategic framework for their own activity. That is: even the strong criticisms levelled at the EU’s specific policies (especially on the topic of liberalism) do not constitute, in the medium term, a strategic plan for a Europe alternative to the EU, including all the countries of the continent, from Portugal to the Urals (including Russia).
a search in the current context for governing alliances with the social-democratic parties of their respective countries, and acceptance of the European Union as the necessary strategic framework for their own activity.
even the strong criticisms levelled at the EU’s specific policies (especially on the topic of liberalism) do not constitute, in the medium term, a strategic plan for a Europe alternative to the EU, including all the countries of the continent, from Portugal to the Urals (including Russia).
In such a context, this position is substantially similar to that of the leftist currents of European social-democracy ( and this is basically the political and cultural framework of the Berlin Appeal and the Political Manifesto — which perhaps one day will become known – of the “Party of the European Left ”), with a crossover debate — not just for the leftist forces — between those favouring (like IU, the German PDS, Synasmpismos, the majority ofCommunist Refoundation) a federal model for the European Union, with elimination of the right of veto in Community decisions; and those instead (as for example the PCF) who favour a confederal model, in which the prerogatives and sovereignty of the national states (including right of veto on basic issues like foreign policy and security) are safeguarded.
In this coalition as well, in European matters, there are major political and programmatic differences: first and foremost, opinions of the draft of the new European Constitution. No one is challenging the principle of the constitutionalisation of the EU , which everyone accepts as strategic framework: but some are highly critical of the current draft, which they accuse of “liberalism” and of strong ambiguity in repudiating war (Communist Refoundation, PCF), whereas others appear considerably more possibilist (IU, PDS, Synaspismos) if not openly favourable (four of the five European deputies of the German PDS have voted in favour, and a fifth — honorary chairman Hans Modrow — later asked that his initial favourable vote be changed to an abstention).
In this coalition as well, in European matters, there are major political and programmatic differences:
first and foremost, opinions of the draft of the new European Constitution.
No one is challenging the principle of the constitutionalisation of the EU , which everyone accepts as strategic framework:
but some are highly critical of the current draft, which they accuse of “liberalism” and of strong ambiguity in repudiating war (Communist Refoundation, PCF), whereas others appear considerably more possibilist (IU, PDS, Synaspismos) if not openly favourable (four of the five European deputies of the German PDS have voted in favour, and a fifth — honorary chairman Hans Modrow — later asked that his initial favourable vote be changed to an abstention).
This coalition’s strong point is that it refers to four of the EU’s main countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain), well beyond the political and electoral strength of the respective parties, which runs around 5%.
In all, this coalition has a pool of about 300,000 registered members and 6 million votes.
- A second coalition includes a majority of the EU’s communist parties: Greek (KKE), Portuguese, Cypriot (AKEL), Czech (KSCM), Slovak (KSS), Hungarian (Munkaspart), German (DKP), Finnish (PCF), Danish (two small parties), Irish (CPI and Workers’ Party), Belgian, Luxemburg (LCP), PdCI.
- A second coalition includes a majority of the EU’s communist parties:
Greek (KKE), Portuguese, Cypriot (AKEL), Czech (KSCM), Slovak (KSS), Hungarian (Munkaspart), German (DKP), Finnish (PCF), Danish (two small parties), Irish (CPI and Workers’ Party), Belgian, Luxemburg (LCP), PdCI.
With varying critical intensity and favorite arguments, they are critical of the process under way: especially because it divides rather than unites, because it is subordinate (according to some) to EU institutions, because it is guided ideologically by parties with a non-communist or “changing” identity. It is not true that these parties, or some among them, are asking for a European party or a coordination of communists only , or a new communist International , marked by the need for broader involvement of anti-capitalist and alternative left forces. Those who say this are either uninformed (and should get informed before speaking) or are knowingly spreading misinformation. We need to stop caricaturing others’ positions, especially with regard to the KKE.
With varying critical intensity and favorite arguments, they are critical of the process under way:
especially because it divides rather than unites, because it is subordinate (according to some) to EU institutions, because it is guided ideologically by parties with a non-communist or “changing” identity.
It is not true that these parties, or some among them, are asking for a European party or a coordination of communists only , or a new communist International , marked by the need for broader involvement of anti-capitalist and alternative left forces.
Those who say this are either uninformed (and should get informed before speaking) or are knowingly spreading misinformation.
We need to stop caricaturing others’ positions, especially with regard to the KKE.
All the major European communist parties are in agreement on broader coordination (GUE –type); some of them are asking not alternatively but complementarily that the communists have a place (not a party or an international) where they can discuss among communists the problems and initiatives that are unique to the communist situation, and that cannot be sought from, much less imposed by, those who are not communist. It is not understandable that the Nordic Green Left or the Trotskyite groups should have their own independent gathering places — including in the form of sub-components of the GUE-NGL, not opposed or as an alternative to it — but that this demand should be denied or exorcised in the case of the communist parties.
the major European communist parties are in agreement on broader coordination (GUE –type); some of them are asking not alternatively but complementarily that the communists have a place (not a party or an international) where they can discuss among communists the problems and initiatives that are unique to the communist situation, and that cannot be sought from, much less imposed by, those who are not communist.
It is not understandable that the Nordic Green Left or the Trotskyite groups should have their own independent gathering places — including in the form of sub-components of the GUE-NGL, not opposed or as an alternative to it — but that this demand should be denied or exorcised in the case of the communist parties.
Strategically, politically and programmatically, this coalition — in virtually all of the forces that make it up (10) — is characterised by fundamental criticism of the EU, considered as an expression of a strategic plan in which European capital — hinging on the Franco-German axis — seeks to promote the formation of a new imperialist coalition, integrated economically, monetarily (the euro), politically and institutionally (the new Constitution) and militarily (the European armed forces), more independent of U.S. hegemony and in global competition with the other emerging powers, in a world where the drive towards multipolarism reveals an irreversible process. No one — among the communist parties — is drawing the conclusion from this awareness that we should today seek to exit the EU, which is a fact — and certainly not a short-term one — of the European reality, which it would be unrealistic to ignore. Yet neither is it claimed (as the social-democrats and even some alternative-left forces do) that the EU is the sole possible horizon within which to work and struggle for another Europe. Which in order to be “other” must base on strategic bases its alternatives to European neo-imperialism and include the entire continent, including Russia, especially since today’s Russia is not homogeneous with such imperialism but is a country, as they say in Washington, undergoing “an uncertain transition.”
No one — among the communist parties — is drawing the conclusion from this awareness that we should today seek to exit the EU, which is a fact — and certainly not a short-term one — of the European reality, which it would be unrealistic to ignore.
Yet neither is it claimed (as the social-democrats and even some alternative-left forces do) that the EU is the sole possible horizon within which to work and struggle for another Europe.
Which in order to be “other” must base on strategic bases its alternatives to European neo-imperialism and include the entire continent, including Russia, especially since today’s Russia is not homogeneous with such imperialism but is a country, as they say in Washington, undergoing “an uncertain transition.”
In all, this group of communist forces has a pool of about 400,000 registered members and 3 million votes.
- A third coalition is formed by the parties of Northern Europe (“Nordic Green Left”), which do not exclude the possibility of leaving the GUE, considered by them too marked by the presence of communists: a presence that could end up being strengthened in the new European parliament by the entry of a significant number of communists from the East, which these Nordic parties see as a smokescreen. This might lead them to seek closer connections with the European Greens. We shall see, after the elections.
a presence that could end up being strengthened in the new European parliament by the entry of a significant number of communists from the East, which these Nordic parties see as a smokescreen.
This might lead them to seek closer connections with the European Greens.
The fact is that last February 1, in Reykjavik (Iceland’s capital), five North European parties held a meeting to formalize the foundation of the Nordic Green Left Alliance (NGLA). These include the four parties heretofore connected to the GUE-NGL (the Swedish Left Party, the Danish People’s Socialist Party, the Finnish Left Alliance — part of the EU — and Norway’s Party of the Socialist Left (outside the E), which were joined by the Green Left Movement of Iceland, also outside the EU (12). This new grouping is operating in its own behalf and seems increasingly uninterested in any sort of “European party” project.
These include the four parties heretofore connected to the GUE-NGL (the Swedish Left Party, the Danish People’s Socialist Party, the Finnish Left Alliance — part of the EU — and Norway’s Party of the Socialist Left (outside the E), which were joined by the Green Left Movement of Iceland, also outside the EU (12). This new grouping is operating in its own behalf and seems increasingly uninterested in any sort of “European party” project.
These parties are against the European Union as such: Norwegians and Icelanders are fighting to stay out; Swedes, Finns and Danes would like to get out. The nature of the criticisms they direct at the EU does not coincide in terms of strategic argumentation with the communists’ anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist criticisms but rather takes the form of a social-democratic defence of an advanced social state, which they see threatened in their countries (and rightly so) by the parameters of the Maastricht EU, the Central European Bank, the euro, and the stability pact. And they react to this threat by trying to defend areas of national and regional autonomy, outside of the EU.
These parties are against the European Union as such:
Norwegians and Icelanders are fighting to stay out; Swedes, Finns and Danes would like to get out.
The nature of the criticisms they direct at the EU does not coincide in terms of strategic argumentation with the communists’ anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist criticisms but rather takes the form of a social-democratic defence of an advanced social state, which they see threatened in their countries (and rightly so) by the parameters of the Maastricht EU, the Central European Bank, the euro, and the stability pact.
And they react to this threat by trying to defend areas of national and regional autonomy, outside of the EU.
In all, this Nordic alliance has about 60,000 registered members and a million and a half votes.
- A fourth coalition is the Trotskyites, today excluded from the “European party” by the opposition of many parties, communist and otherwise, including the PCF and the German PDS, which are part of the “head group” of founders. The argument behind this opposition is that the Trotskyite groups, unlike the others, already have — in addition to the Fourth International — their own permanent, structured coordination on a European scale (the “European Conference of the Anti-capitalist Left”), of which even the Communist Refoundationis a member — the sole GUE party. This conference excludes almost all of the other GUE parties. For this reason, the Trotskyite groups cannot keep one foot in two or three shoes at the same time.
The argument behind this opposition is that the Trotskyite groups, unlike the others, already have — in addition to the Fourth International — their own permanent, structured coordination on a European scale (the “European Conference of the Anti-capitalist Left”), of which even the Communist Refoundationis a member — the sole GUE party. This conference excludes almost all of the other GUE parties.
For this reason, the Trotskyite groups cannot keep one foot in two or three shoes at the same time.
Strategically speaking, these groups consider the EU — as do most of the communist parties — as the expression of a neo-imperialist plan. But compared to the communist parties they tend to underestimate the matter of the national dimension of class conflict and of the necessary defence of the sovereignty of the national states against the invasive reactionary policies of the EU’s supernational structures. As is characteristic of the tradition of the Trotskyite groups, although different from one another, they all tend to shift everything to an “alternative supernationality” (European strikes, supernational coordination of struggles, a socialist programme alternative to a capitalist Europe), which, frankly, comes off as an unrealistic flight forward, lacking any solid grounding in national reality and in real (non-imaginary) levels of awareness of the workers’ movements in individual countries.
Strategically speaking, these groups consider the EU — as do most of the communist parties — as the expression of a neo-imperialist plan.
But compared to the communist parties they tend to underestimate the matter of the national dimension of class conflict and of the necessary defence of the sovereignty of the national states against the invasive reactionary policies of the EU’s supernational structures.
As is characteristic of the tradition of the Trotskyite groups, although different from one another, they all tend to shift everything to an “alternative supernationality” (European strikes, supernational coordination of struggles, a socialist programme alternative to a capitalist Europe), which, frankly, comes off as an unrealistic flight forward, lacking any solid grounding in national reality and in real (non-imaginary) levels of awareness of the workers’ movements in individual countries.
In all, this coalition has about 15,000 militants in all the EU, and a million and a half votes (perhaps two million, perhaps less, given the unpredictable and substantial fluctuations in the French vote for the Trotskyite groups, as the elections of recent years have demonstrated).
7) The means by which we arrived at the Berlin meeting of January 10-11, 2004, and at the Athens meeting February 14-15, are to say the least disconcerting from the standpoint of the democratic method, fairness and equal dignity among the various forces of the “alternative left.”
This has produced a climate of growing mutual distrust, of non-loyalty and transparency in relations between the parties, which undermine at their very roots the conditions necessary for true solidarity and unity of action (13), already rendered complex by the existence among the GUE’s parties of political and programmatic divergences which have always made unity and common initiative precarious. This should encourage everyone to avoid forcing, as in the case of the accelerated construction of a “European party,” which would presuppose other strategic convergences (14).
This should encourage everyone to avoid forcing, as in the case of the accelerated construction of a “European party,” which would presuppose other strategic convergences (14).
What has the “European party’s” process been instead?
The first meeting was held in April 2003 in Athens, at the initiative of Synaspismos, which invited all the parties connected with the GUE-NGL, except the Greek CP (KKE) , shut out a priori even before beginning. This is like the PdCI (Party of Italian Communists) calling such a meeting in Rome and inviting everyone except Refoundation.
This is like the PdCI (Party of Italian Communists) calling such a meeting in Rome and inviting everyone except Refoundation.
The second meeting was also held in Greece, in June 2003, again excluding the KKE. Meanwhile, various draft charters and manifestos were prepared, which to date — regarding the charter — have not led to unified solutions, even among the four members of the “head group.” At this point, the KKE withdrew from all participation in the process, and the relationship has not been restored. The parties of the East are still excluded.
The second meeting was also held in Greece, in June 2003, again excluding the KKE.
Meanwhile, various draft charters and manifestos were prepared, which to date — regarding the charter — have not led to unified solutions, even among the four members of the “head group.”
At this point, the KKE withdrew from all participation in the process, and the relationship has not been restored.
The parties of the East are still excluded.
The third meeting was held in Madrid at the initiative of IU, and the fourth in Brussels. The parties of the East are still excluded. The fifth meeting was held in Berlin in January 2004, where the PDS had invited as observers certain parties from the East (and this is a step forward), but even here arbitrary criteria were used (for example, the communists and other alternative-left forces of Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic states, ex-Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Belarus, and European Russia were excluded). As always the German CP (DKP) was excluded; the PDS has always vetoed its participation in these events. Finally, again in Athens, as we described.
The third meeting was held in Madrid at the initiative of IU, and the fourth in Brussels.
The fifth meeting was held in Berlin in January 2004, where the PDS had invited as observers certain parties from the East (and this is a step forward), but even here arbitrary criteria were used (for example, the communists and other alternative-left forces of Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic states, ex-Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Belarus, and European Russia were excluded).
As always the German CP (DKP) was excluded; the PDS has always vetoed its participation in these events.
Finally, again in Athens, as we described.
8) Today it would be far more realistic, unifying, and electorally effective to go the route of a common political and programmatic manifesto for the European elections, on unifying themes (wages, pensions, social status, peace and cooperation, etc.). This was demonstrated by the recent initiatives of the PCF and the PCP, taken in this spirit, which encountered a fairly broad consensus and a willingness to sign a common manifesto on the part of almost all the communist and alternative-left parties of the 25 countries that on June 13 will take part in the European elections. Whereas a public division among these parties on the eve of the elections regarding the “European party” issue would have an assuredly negative political and image impact for the entire alliance, which would be exploited and emphasised in the media by the parties of the socialist International and by the European Greens to present a divided and quarrelsome — and hence not very credible —communist and alternative left.
This was demonstrated by the recent initiatives of the PCF and the PCP, taken in this spirit, which encountered a fairly broad consensus and a willingness to sign a common manifesto on the part of almost all the communist and alternative-left parties of the 25 countries that on June 13 will take part in the European elections.
Whereas a public division among these parties on the eve of the elections regarding the “European party” issue would have an assuredly negative political and image impact for the entire alliance, which would be exploited and emphasised in the media by the parties of the socialist International and by the European Greens to present a divided and quarrelsome — and hence not very credible —communist and alternative left.
The least that can be done at this point in order not to crystallize irreparable divisions and keep a unifying process open is to put off any founding formalisation of the “European party” until after the elections. Then we should resume the discussion process on a basis of unity and equal dignity, dispensing with prejudicial vetoes and exclusions of any type: by opening up to all of the Continent’s communist and alternative-left forces in order to reach together, without haste and organisational coercion, solutions that are shared by a coalition that is considerably broader than the decidedly minority alliance achieved to date.
Then we should resume the discussion process on a basis of unity and equal dignity, dispensing with prejudicial vetoes and exclusions of any type:
by opening up to all of the Continent’s communist and alternative-left forces in order to reach together, without haste and organisational coercion, solutions that are shared by a coalition that is considerably broader than the decidedly minority alliance achieved to date.
(1) In a resolution on October 4, 2003, by the CC of the KSCM, openly critical of the “European party” project presented, it was affirmed four months ago that “institutionalisation of cooperation among the parties of the Left can be achieved only as the natural outcome of a phase of unity of action practiced successfully. In the current situation, bypassing this stage cannot contribute to real unity in the European Left.” Despite personal initiatives by certain spokesmen lacking a mandate from their leadership bodies, the KSCM has always reconfirmed its initial position, and particularly in its Directive of January 16, 2004, in the CC on January 25, 2004, and in the Directive of February 6 last, whose resolution (made public) maintains that “ the major parties of the East European countries must be involved in the founding process,” that “selective approaches, which have heretofore dominated this process, are to be rejected,” that “ foundation schedules and methods must not compromise the effective unity of the communist movement in Europe and therefore this political subject must not be established before the European elections ,” that “ for the KSCM the priority is the programmatic unity and unity of action of the left in Europe,” that “ the European left must not identify itself with the institutions of the European Union” that “the representatives of the KSCM shall take part in this process as active observers and will not decide on any further step without the approval of the Central Committee . ”
In the current situation, bypassing this stage cannot contribute to real unity in the European Left.”
Despite personal initiatives by certain spokesmen lacking a mandate from their leadership bodies, the KSCM has always reconfirmed its initial position, and particularly in its Directive of January 16, 2004, in the CC on January 25, 2004, and in the Directive of February 6 last, whose resolution (made public) maintains that “ the major parties of the East European countries must be involved in the founding process,” that “selective approaches, which have heretofore dominated this process, are to be rejected,” that “ foundation schedules and methods must not compromise the effective unity of the communist movement in Europe and therefore this political subject must not be established before the European elections ,” that “ for the KSCM the priority is the programmatic unity and unity of action of the left in Europe,” that “ the European left must not identify itself with the institutions of the European Union” that “the representatives of the KSCM shall take part in this process as active observers and will not decide on any further step without the approval of the Central Committee . ”
Only someone who is uninformed or who prefers not to see could have spread unfounded interpretations in this regard.
(2) The differences among the promoters are between those who (for example, the leadership of the COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION, the PDS, Synaspismos) who want a “heavy” charter as a true supernational organisation, that can take decisions even with a qualified majority, and that provides the possibility of registration in the European party even on the part of movements, associations, and even individual citizens, and registered members and groups of registered members of other parties (current?) that are not part of the “European subject” as a party ; and those who (for example, the PCF and others) require - upon penalty of their non-participation in the project, that the Charter fully respect the sovereignty of every national party, and that it therefore provides that decisions are taken based on consent and not on a majority, and that opposes individual registrations (which would open the way, among other things, to “supernational” interference in the internal life of other parties) and the registration of associations not better identified, which would blur the boundaries between party and movements, with which there should rather be established a close relationship of cooperation, in mutual autonomy.
(3) The choice of venue becomes a serious political problem if it is wished to hold the founding congress before the European elections. And if we wish to respect the golden rule of non-interference, those countries where there is a competitive election between parties both of which are part of the GUE but are divided on the “European party” should be excluded. For example, Greece (competition among KKE, Synaspismos, and DIKKI), France (PCF and Trotskyite lists), and Italy (COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION and PdCI competition) should be excluded. Whereas there would not be problems of this type in Spain, Germany and Austria. Not by chance, in an interview in Neues Deutschland on February 16, one of the German PDS’s leading exponents, Wolfgang Gehrcke, commenting on the Athens meeting, noted that in the discussion process “in Italy, the PdCI participated as an observer, alongside Bertinotti’s party and — as we requested — both the parties will have to cooperate in the founding congress.” Can you imagine?
(3) The choice of venue becomes a serious political problem if it is wished to hold the founding congress before the European elections.
And if we wish to respect the golden rule of non-interference, those countries where there is a competitive election between parties both of which are part of the GUE but are divided on the “European party” should be excluded.
For example, Greece (competition among KKE, Synaspismos, and DIKKI), France (PCF and Trotskyite lists), and Italy (COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION and PdCI competition) should be excluded.
Whereas there would not be problems of this type in Spain, Germany and Austria. Not by chance, in an interview in Neues Deutschland on February 16, one of the German PDS’s leading exponents, Wolfgang Gehrcke, commenting on the Athens meeting, noted that in the discussion process “in Italy, the PdCI participated as an observer, alongside Bertinotti’s party and — as we requested — both the parties will have to cooperate in the founding congress.”
As we can see, everything would be much simpler after the elections.
(4) Note instead that the outlawing of certain communist parties in the Baltic states (their leaders have been in jail for years now) that are about to enter the EU, or the persistence in EU countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia of legislation prohibiting or criminally penalising the use of communist symbols and propaganda, over which actual trials have begun, the latest being that against Attila Vajnai, vice chairman of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (Munkaspart) because he wore a badge with a red star on his lapel, have not been considered adequate grounds for challenging these countries’ compliance with the “democratic” principles sanctioned by the EU Treaties.
We are aware of the recent astounding statements by some spokesmen for the European People’s Party, according to whom those who have played responsible roles in past East European “totalitarian” regimes should be prohibited from running for the European parliament.
We wonder what interferences in internal life, statutory regulations and public funding (with the relative sanctions) could be exercised by a European parliament in which such reactionary orientations prevailed. The possibility is anything but science fiction, in the present context, where a member of the EU Commission (the European Union’s “government”) like the German Gunter Verheugen – social-democratic PDS, former high official in the Interior and Foreign Ministries in his country and today the Commissioner responsible for expansion of the EU to other countries — in a discussion on September 30, 2003, at the meeting of the foreign affairs committee of the European parliament, responding to a question regarding the clauses outlawing the communist parties and their symbols in some East European EU member countries, replied: “If I may be allowed to express a political comment, I can affirm that if I personally had experienced what the peoples in Eastern Europe have experienced, I would be the first to ask that the Communist Party be banded in those countries” (now that’s plain speaking!). In response to a letter of protest over these statements, sent by the European deputy of the Greek CP (KKE), Strathis Korakis, to the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, the latter replied that “the banning of the communist party in a country that is about to enter the EU can in no case represent cause for particular debate in the context of the political criteria mentioned before” (the reference is to criteria expressed by the EU summit in Copenhagen on December 11-12, 2002, which approved expansion of the EU from 15 countries to 25, with eight out of ten of the new entries involving countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union). “These statements,” according to a memo from the Foreign Section of the KKE, “not only legitimise un-democratic anti-communist clauses, prohibitions and persecutions in a series of EU countries but also create the conditions for a potential extension of such members to other member states, since they introduce the idea that democracy and the banning of the communist parties are compatible.”
The possibility is anything but science fiction, in the present context, where a member of the EU Commission (the European Union’s “government”) like the German Gunter Verheugen – social-democratic PDS, former high official in the Interior and Foreign Ministries in his country and today the Commissioner responsible for expansion of the EU to other countries — in a discussion on September 30, 2003, at the meeting of the foreign affairs committee of the European parliament, responding to a question regarding the clauses outlawing the communist parties and their symbols in some East European EU member countries, replied:
“If I may be allowed to express a political comment, I can affirm that if I personally had experienced what the peoples in Eastern Europe have experienced, I would be the first to ask that the Communist Party be banded in those countries” (now that’s plain speaking!).
In response to a letter of protest over these statements, sent by the European deputy of the Greek CP (KKE), Strathis Korakis, to the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, the latter replied that “the banning of the communist party in a country that is about to enter the EU can in no case represent cause for particular debate in the context of the political criteria mentioned before” (the reference is to criteria expressed by the EU summit in Copenhagen on December 11-12, 2002, which approved expansion of the EU from 15 countries to 25, with eight out of ten of the new entries involving countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union).
“These statements,” according to a memo from the Foreign Section of the KKE, “not only legitimise un-democratic anti-communist clauses, prohibitions and persecutions in a series of EU countries but also create the conditions for a potential extension of such members to other member states, since they introduce the idea that democracy and the banning of the communist parties are compatible.”
(5) Interference in the internal life of parties, their charters, and their means of self-funding is beginning to manifest itself even in the national legislation of certain EU countries. For example, the Portuguese communist party has for some time been involved in a bitter nationwide political and institutional struggle against laws supported using “bipolar” logic by conservatives and socialists, which call for major interference in the internal life of parties, in the formulation of their charters, and even go so far as to limit as much as possible their chances for self-funding not deriving from state subsidies (militant self-funding which, in the case of the PCP, reaches 70% and makes that party less dependent on state funding).
For example, the Portuguese communist party has for some time been involved in a bitter nationwide political and institutional struggle against laws supported using “bipolar” logic by conservatives and socialists, which call for major interference in the internal life of parties, in the formulation of their charters, and even go so far as to limit as much as possible their chances for self-funding not deriving from state subsidies (militant self-funding which, in the case of the PCP, reaches 70% and makes that party less dependent on state funding).
(6) Thesis 35 and the concluding political document of the 5 th National Congress of the COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION call for the “construction of a new European political subject ( no mention of a party – ed. ) to UNITE the forces of the antagonist and alternative communist left, ON A CONTINENTAL SCALE ...in their political and organisational diversity” and without thinking “either of organisational merger or of ideological compression.”
In fact, the methods chosen for the Europe-wide debate and the speedup imposed by the leadership of certain parties have produced a situation of deep and disturbing division among the major communist and alternative-left parties in Europe, and in many cases within them, even among the parties promoting the Berlin “Appeal” (as is the case of the PCF and the COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION itself), as well as deep divisions within the GUE-NGL which, if we do not change course, run the risk of prejudicing their reunification in the next legislative term.
Rather than UNITING, we are multiplying the divisions and dissociations, and this certainly contradicts the spirit and letter of Thesis 35.
Out of the 40 communist and alternative-left parties active in the EU countries, which become 60 if we consider Europe ON THE CONTINENTAL SCALE, only 11 have signed the Berlin Appeal, and two of them (the Czech Communist Party and the Slovak Communist Party) have already revised their position, did not participate in the Athens meeting on February 14-15, 2004, and have clearly distanced themselves from hasty hypotheses of a constituent congress.
In order to fully evaluate the fallout from the decisions of the East European parties, it should be said — despite the political and ideological differences with the current hypothesis of a “Party of the European Left” — that they would have a pragmatic interest in participating in order to avail themselves of the funding (and these parties are in considerably more precarious financial conditions than their west European cousins), and an interest in using the “protection” of the “European Party” with respect to the fiercely anti-communist legislation in their countries. In this sense, their political decision not to participate in the current project — however we may wish to evaluate it — is of great political significance and is consistent with their own positions of principle.
In this sense, their political decision not to participate in the current project — however we may wish to evaluate it — is of great political significance and is consistent with their own positions of principle.
The nine parties whose leaders seem willing to participate in a constituent congress for a “European Party” before the European elections have a total of approximately 300,000 registered members, with an electoral pool of approximately 6 million votes. The others, in the EU alone, have about 400,000 registered members and some 6 million votes, and, in total, considering the whole continent, about 1 million registered members and more than 20 million votes. That is: the “included” count for about 20% of the total votes and registered members of all of the European communist and alternative left. If this is what UNITE means, we need to rethink the matter.
The others, in the EU alone, have about 400,000 registered members and some 6 million votes, and, in total, considering the whole continent, about 1 million registered members and more than 20 million votes.
the “included” count for about 20% of the total votes and registered members of all of the European communist and alternative left.
If this is what UNITE means, we need to rethink the matter.
(7) The founding congress of the European Green Party will be held in Rome on February 20-22; this will bring together 32 full member parties (plus 7 observers) from 36 countries from all over the continent (EU members and non-members). A political subject that effectively unifies and coordinates all of the European ecologist galaxy, and which includes among its full members the Greens of Russia, which link together inter-regionally a series of ecologist groups in Georgia, Ukraine, and Romania; and, as observers, the Greens of Serbia, Albania, Slovenia and Moldavia. That is how we should work and unite!
A political subject that effectively unifies and coordinates all of the European ecologist galaxy, and which includes among its full members the Greens of Russia, which link together inter-regionally a series of ecologist groups in Georgia, Ukraine, and Romania; and, as observers, the Greens of Serbia, Albania, Slovenia and Moldavia. That is how we should work and unite!
“ It is said that the other “families” (Greens, Socialists) have their own European parties, and that we can’t do without one. But in their parties everyone participates, everyone recognises one another, even if they hold completely different positions. Those were processes of unification, not of rupture. We have to work to find possible forms of unity, inclusive and not exclusive. Haste is always dangerous, especially if it is part of an election ” (Claudio Grassi, speech to the Leadership of the COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION, January 28, 2004) .
It is said that the other “families” (Greens, Socialists) have their own European parties, and that we can’t do without one.
But in their parties everyone participates, everyone recognises one another, even if they hold completely different positions.
Those were processes of unification, not of rupture.
We have to work to find possible forms of unity, inclusive and not exclusive.
Haste is always dangerous, especially if it is part of an election ”
(Claudio Grassi, speech to the Leadership of the COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION, January 28, 2004) .
(8) It is these vetoes, or their passive acceptance, that contradict Thesis 35 of the 5 th National Congress of the COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION, which calls for “ uniting the forces of the communist, antagonist and alternative left on a continental scale .”
(9) To varying degrees, the division is also present among the four “head” parties for the current European Party project: COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION, PCF, Izquierda Unida, German PDS.
(9) To varying degrees, the division is also present among the four “head” parties for the current European Party project:
COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION, PCF, Izquierda Unida, German PDS.
On this topic, the leadership groups of the PCF and the COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION are divided in half.
In the COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION, on January 28, 2004, the national leadership approved the line indicated by the National Secretary by 21 votes to 18. I wonder: what other party, communist or otherwise, would proceed quickly with a project of such scope as the founding in a few months of a “supernational party” with such an uncertain and tiny majority, as if the party’s fate depended on it?
what other party, communist or otherwise, would proceed quickly with a project of such scope as the founding in a few months of a “supernational party” with such an uncertain and tiny majority, as if the party’s fate depended on it?
In the PCF, the question is causing unease and considerable division. And there is a congressional mandate that requires the leadership organs to consult formally with all registered members before taking a final decision. A consultation that is from the outset rather uncertain, if we consider that, in the congressional consultation of registered members at the last congress of the PCF, the two left components (criticisms of the current European party project, and the opposition of the current leading group) obtained a total of 45%, while reservations and basic objections to the project are present even in sectors of the current majority that are anything but marginal. And it is certainly no accident that the National Secretary of the PCF, despite announcements on the eve of it, did not participate in the Athens meeting last February 14-15, where, according to some national leaders of the PCF, the COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION, Izquierda Unida and the German PDS should have jointly made the announcement of the founding congress for the new “European party” to be held in Rome on the eve of the European elections.
In the PCF, the question is causing unease and considerable division.
And there is a congressional mandate that requires the leadership organs to consult formally with all registered members before taking a final decision.
A consultation that is from the outset rather uncertain, if we consider that, in the congressional consultation of registered members at the last congress of the PCF, the two left components (criticisms of the current European party project, and the opposition of the current leading group) obtained a total of 45%, while reservations and basic objections to the project are present even in sectors of the current majority that are anything but marginal.
And it is certainly no accident that the National Secretary of the PCF, despite announcements on the eve of it, did not participate in the Athens meeting last February 14-15, where, according to some national leaders of the PCF, the COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION, Izquierda Unida and the German PDS should have jointly made the announcement of the founding congress for the new “European party” to be held in Rome on the eve of the European elections.
In Izquierda Unida, discussion of the “European party” has not even begun. IU held its national congress in late December, in a unanimistic and pre-election mode (in Spain political elections are held on March 14). For this reason, in order to avoid starting discussions on a controversial topic, the topic was removed from the congress’s debate, no one spoke about it, and it is not even found in the Congress documents and concluding resolutions (just as with the congress on the European Constitution, on which IU and its leadership group are divided).
In Izquierda Unida, discussion of the “European party” has not even begun.
IU held its national congress in late December, in a unanimistic and pre-election mode (in Spain political elections are held on March 14).
For this reason, in order to avoid starting discussions on a controversial topic, the topic was removed from the congress’s debate, no one spoke about it, and it is not even found in the Congress documents and concluding resolutions (just as with the congress on the European Constitution, on which IU and its leadership group are divided).
In the German PDS there is internal opposition that comes from the communist tendencies and from those harking back to the Marxist Forum. But it should be said that in that party there is an especially strong illusion (and anxiety) that the launching of the “European party” before the next European elections may help the party reach the 5% threshold (today polls put the PDS at 3.9%), below which the party would disappear from the European parliament, as it has already disappeared from the national parliament, and would see its very survival threatened, given the primarily institutional and opinion-based nature of that party.
In the German PDS there is internal opposition that comes from the communist tendencies and from those harking back to the Marxist Forum.
But it should be said that in that party there is an especially strong illusion (and anxiety) that the launching of the “European party” before the next European elections may help the party reach the 5% threshold (today polls put the PDS at 3.9%), below which the party would disappear from the European parliament, as it has already disappeared from the national parliament, and would see its very survival threatened, given the primarily institutional and opinion-based nature of that party.
(10) A separate argument is required for the position of the PdCI on the EU, in many respects similar to that of the COMMUNIST REFOUNDATION majority, and on this point similar to the leanings of the leftist components of European social-democracy. But I will not get into that.
(11) Not by chance, the document presented by the comrades at the national leadership meeting of January 28, 2004, citing the “area of the Ernesto, ” states that “the EU is not all of Europe” and that “the EU’s institutions are not neutral but form a process of neo-imperialist concentration of European capital.”
(12) The materials (in English) of this new Nordic Alliance — political manifesto, charter, other information, can be requested at:
(13) In a resolution of October 20, 2003, “ the CC of the Portuguese Communist Party expresses serious concern for the direction taken by the process relating to creation of a “European political party” and to the damage that such a process may cause to the necessary cooperation of those forces that, despite some major differences, have collaborated in the GUE and in other multilateral initiatives.
The PCP views negatively the institutionalisation of “European parties” in the EU Treaties and does not consider this a priority matter. Having said this, the PCP is committed to a unified solution to the problem, a solution based on the parties that takes into account the experience of the GUE, respects the sovereignty and equality of all with a minimal, flexible structure, working collectively on the basis of consent and rotating responsibilities, with a concise platform closely associated with concrete issues of struggle.
The PCP views negatively the institutionalisation of “European parties” in the EU Treaties and does not consider this a priority matter.
Having said this, the PCP is committed to a unified solution to the problem, a solution based on the parties that takes into account the experience of the GUE, respects the sovereignty and equality of all with a minimal, flexible structure, working collectively on the basis of consent and rotating responsibilities, with a concise platform closely associated with concrete issues of struggle.
Recent developments in this process have brought to the fore questions of unacceptable methods that contradict basic principles in relationships among parties, reveal discrimination, and undermine the necessary mutual trust. Such developments could precipitate towards an artificial construction that ignores the differences that must be kept in mind, and that opts for restricted criteria of political and ideological affinity which the PCP cannot accept.”
Such developments could precipitate towards an artificial construction that ignores the differences that must be kept in mind, and that opts for restricted criteria of political and ideological affinity which the PCP cannot accept.”
This resolution was sent to all interested parties with a cover letter from the PCP Secretary reiterating “surprise and disapproval at methods that create serious damage to the necessary cooperation of communists and other progressive forces.”
The PCP’s official decision not to participate in the current “European party” project, published in Avante (January 22, 2004), can be found in full, translated into Italian, at: www.resistenze.org : Nuove resistenti , n.69.
On November 20, 2003, the national leadership of the PdCI also sent a letter to the interested parties, criticising the fact that “a special relationship appears to be developing among certain parties, or among their leaders, and hence the new party would no longer be created on an equal basis.”
(14) In a letter from the KKE’s CC sent to all interested parties (September 2003), it is noted that “the founding of a Party of the European Left does not help the effective cooperation and coordination of the communist forces and other radical-left forces....This project ignores the profound political and ideological differences — and even conflicts — between the viewpoints of our parties on crucial issues: like European unification and opinions of the EU; the role of the present capitalist EU in the world; programmes; the type of society we are fighting for; overcoming capitalism, and the socialist perspective; the policy of alliances, and the relationship with social-democracy. Differences that have repeatedly emerged in the GUE.
like European unification and opinions of the EU; the role of the present capitalist EU in the world; programmes; the type of society we are fighting for; overcoming capitalism, and the socialist perspective; the policy of alliances, and the relationship with social-democracy.
Differences that have repeatedly emerged in the GUE.
Ignoring this reality and looking towards the creation of a European party means feeding false illusions and expectations among workers and peoples, and injuring the principles of equality, sovereignty and independence that ought to characterise relations among our parties. And in the end, this will backfire against all of us.”
And in the end, this will backfire against all of us.”
(This article will be published, a little shortened, in the next issue of the italian review L’Ernesto , n° 1, jan-feb 2004)